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The governance of urban transport involves a complex amalgam of intergovernmental actors, 
revenue sources and normative justifications. In recent decades, there has been a clear shift 
toward decentralized approaches to urban transport investment. This devolution of responsibility 
supports the development and deployment of new governance strategies that rely heavily on sub-
regional implementation strategies and that justify urban transport in terms of economic 
development, not mobility impacts. This dissertation provides a grounded view of the devolution 
of urban transport planning through an in-depth case study of the implementation of a modern 
streetcar investment in Kansas City, Missouri. Using a combination of institutional analysis and 
phronesis, it illuminates the antecedents of local governance strategies, like value capture and 
non-profit governance, and shows how local conditions and history are shaping transport policy 
in unanticipated ways. While new governance strategies support enhanced investment, they also 
shape who benefits from new investments. In the Kansas City case, policies in the streetcar’s 
proximity emphasized the importance of lifestyle diversity and nurturing the development of an 
emerging arts community but eschewed notions of race and income diversity in ways that reflect 
and exacerbate the city’s dismal history of segregation. Devolution is facilitating new 
governance arrangements that reflect local conditions but, as this case shows, these new 
strategies may also be setting urban transport on a troubling institutional trajectory that – without 
intervention – will only lead us away from equitable and inclusive cities.   
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Urban transportation in the United States involves a complex amalgamation of federal, 
state and local actors and revenue sources. Over the past century, the balance of funding sources 
and the parties involved have shifted considerably, with recent decades being marked by a clear 
trend toward devolution (Goldman and Wachs 2003, Taylor 2004). Devolution, or the 
decentralization of public service provision, is part of a larger historical trend of transport 
provision – and other public services – moving toward and then away from centralized provision 
during the 20th century (Graham and Marvin 2001). By providing localities with wider discretion 
to plan, finance and manage urban transport investments, decentralization encourages the 
development and deployment of innovative governance strategies that facilitate investment. 
These strategies also shape provision in ways that challenge traditional planning doctrines (King 
and Fischer 2016) and may lead cities further away from sustainable, equitable urban 
development.  
This dissertation is about the politics of urban transport in the age of devolution. 
Transportation planning and investment is inherently political, a term I use to emphasize the 
primary role that value-laden political processes – not technical concerns – have in the practice 
of transport planning (Altshuler 1965, Flyvbjerg 1998, Wachs 2004). Contemporary transport 
policies are concerned with facilitating change – both in transport modes and in urban 
development patterns (Curtis et al. 2009, Cervero 1998) – but policy efforts are often stymied by 
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institutional path dependencies that hinder change to the status quo (Curtis and Low 2012). 
Approaching urban transport from an explicitly political perspective allows for an assessment of 
the causal mechanisms shaping contemporary urban transport, an identification of the actors 
leveraging those mechanisms with success, and an evaluation of the goals, implementation 
strategies and outcomes of emerging trends in urban transport policy.     
Existing work on the decentralization of transport planning focuses on how changes to 
federal and state policies facilitate enhanced roles for metropolitan and county actors (Goldman 
and Wachs 2003, Taylor 2004, Green 2006, Sciara and Wachs 2007), while also identifying an 
iterative relationship between local planning decisions and federal funding allocations (Lowe 
2013). Past research is largely based on aggregated federal (Taylor 2004, Lowe 2013) or state 
level (Goldman and Wachs 2003) data and by experiences in the state of California. As a result, 
research on devolution tends to emphasize the withdrawal of federal and state actors from the 
planning process, and pays less attention to how local governments are leveraging devolution to 
their advantage. This research shifts the loci of analysis by taking a grounded view of devolution.   
In this manuscript, I use an institutional framework to provide an anatomy of a modern 
streetcar investment in Kansas City, MO. Relying primarily on qualitative data, I document the 
institutional design activities of local actors to integrate transport, land use and economic 
development planning, to shape real estate trends and to build institutional capacity in favor of 
higher density, transit-oriented development patterns. The resulting work helps identify the 
structuring forces behind contemporary transport planning and informs our understanding of how 
local actors are shaping contemporary cities. By providing an in-depth examination into the 
politics of urban mobility I am able to speak to causality in how institutional mechanisms inhibit 
and shape change as well as speak to the conditions surrounding their formation and 
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implementation. “Understanding how and why institutional strategies are born, grow, change, 
and die” (Alexander 2005, 210), helps identify the structuring forces of society (Giddens 1984).  
My research methodology allows for theoretical generalizations on three questions: (1) 
What are the benefits of devolution from the view of local actors? (2) How are local actors using 
institutional design in response to the opportunities provided by devolution? and (3) Who 
benefits and loses, and by what mechanisms of power? The answers derived from the Kansas 
City case - provided in the conclusion - can be tested and refined with additional cases. More 
generally, by considering the rationality of goals as well as the institutional barriers to their 
realization, this work lays the groundwork for a comparative institutional framework for urban 
transport that is critical, politically-informed and aimed at facilitating justice and equity in the 
context of the ‘devolution revolution’ (Wachs 2003).  
This manuscript, organized around three essays, proceeds as follows. In the reminder of 
this introductory chapter, I discuss the project’s analytical framework and describe the 
methodology. In the first essay, I illustrate the utility of an institutional framework for 
understanding the politics of urban transportation, using the example of 20th century American 
cities. The second and third essays rely on a mixed methods investigation of a modern streetcar 
project in Kansas City, Missouri. In the second essay, I examine the creation and implementation 
of a value capture financing mechanism, showing how local actors used financing to shape the 
politics of investment in surprising ways. In the third essay I examine the social sustainability of 
the streetcar project, highlighting local actors’ innovations to create and foster urbanity and 
community and also problematizing the exclusive nature of these efforts. All three essays use the 
language of institutions and employ a critical lens that look for the processes and power behind 
disparate outcomes. In the conclusion I summarize thematic findings across the three essays to 
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draw larger lessons for the politics of transport planning in the age of devolution. I also make 
broader theoretical connections and discuss future research plans.      
Analytical Framework  
This project reflects my central concern with power in public decision-making processes 
and outcomes (Flyvbjerg 1998, Flyvbjerg et al. 2003, Priemus et al. 2008). I use an analytic 
framework that combines institutional theory with phronesis, an approach to social science 
research that centralizes issues of value and power (Flyvbjerg 2001). While traditional studies of 
power tend to focus more narrowly on the Weberian question of “Who Governs” (Dahl 1961, 
Stone 1989), phronesis research expands to include the Nietzschean question of “What 
government rationalities are at work when those who govern, govern?” (Flyvbjerg 2001, 131), or 
a more general focus on the mechanisms through which power acts. Phronesis understands 
power as a productive and positive force that is appropriated and re-appropriated in a constant 
back-and-forth movement (Flyvbjerg 2001, 131).  
The central question of how power is exercised demands an analysis of decision-making 
processes as well as the structures that shape those processes. Abstract notions related to power – 
like equity and social justice – can only be assessed by examining the realpolitik of everyday 
activity, or the power of “play” (Lindblom 1969). As such, power-related research requires a 
concern with implementation, which represents a “struggle over the realization of ideas” 
(Pressman and Wildavsky 1976, 176). In urban transport - where plans for action are rarely 
realized in their totality - implementation research helps illuminate the constraints under which 
policy ideas are expected to operate while also illustrating when and how specific actors are able 
“forge subsequent links in the causal chain to achieve desired results” (ibid, ii).  
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Governance, or “the pursuit of collective goals through an inclusive strategy of resource 
mobilization” (Pierre 2005, 449) is accomplished by the purposeful leveraging of institutions, or 
the formal and informal aspects of collective decision-making, including laws, organizational 
arrangements, networks and values (Alexander 2005). As the instruments that stakeholders use to 
secure implementation of particular principles, institutions play a central role in planning and 
public policy (Guailini 2001). As socially created structures, institutions are malleable and can 
be purposively and strategically altered to favor particular outcomes and, in some circumstances, 
to change the larger structuring conditions (Low et al. 2003). Indeed, in both phronesis and 
institutional analysis, “actors and their practices are analyzed in relation to structures and 
structures in terms of agency…so that structures are found as part of actors and actors as part of 
structures” (Flyvbjerg 2001, 137).  
A phronetic approach to social science research encourages researchers to identify points 
of conflict, and a conspicuous lack of conflict, in local decision-making process. Considering the 
formation and deployment of institutional strategies that minimize and resolve conflict to 
facilitate public investment helps to identify where power differentials exist and to evaluate the 
causal processes behind negotiated outcomes. Phronetic research aims to answer four questions: 
(1) Where are we going? (2) Is this desirable? (3) What should be done? And (4) Who gains and 
losses, by what mechanisms of power? (Flyvbjerg 2001, 60).  
Decentralization may be beneficial if it improves decision-making by moving it closer to 
those impacted by decisions, but this is a hypothesis not an axiom. To what extent 
decentralization is desirable, who is winning and losing, by what mechanisms and what, if 
anything, can and should be done? are questions that can only be answered with an in-depth 
investigation of local transport investment in the age of the devolution. The methodology 
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described below is derived from phronesis and institutional theory, and aimed at identifying and 
evaluating the ‘mechanisms of power’ shaping a modern streetcar investment in Kansas City, 
Missouri.     
Methodology 
Phronesis encourages the use of “flat and empirical” questions that support the “thick 
description” of decision-making in context (Clifford Geertz as citied in Flyvbjerg 2001, 131). 
This project departs from the behavior and perspectives of local stakeholders to provide a thick 
description of the institutional design processes surrounding a modern streetcar investment in 
Kansas City. The methodology supports the assessment of institutional barriers and opportunities 
to collective action, an evaluation of the factors shaping project development as well as the 
logics and values that dominate project implementation.   
Research Design  
The methods employed for this project differ from existing research on transportation 
planning and policy. As a scholarly field, transportation research is dominated by quantitative 
research that relies on aggregated data to identify trends and assess outcomes of specific policy 
interventions. The majority of this work evaluates projects or policies once they are in place, 
placing minimal emphasis on or only addressing the details of implementation to explain (less 
than desirable) performance outcomes. Implementation research should be concurrent with 
project implementation as stakeholder perspectives obtained from hindsight often “fail to 
recognize the initial differences and challenges that had to be overcome” (Pressman and 
Wildavsky 1984, ii). A better understanding of the decision-making processes behind observed 
outcomes can help researchers and local actors identify the causal mechanisms at work in a given 
context and better evaluate the equity aspects of the planning process. Without understanding the 
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details of implementation – why actors make certain decisions, what outcomes matter most to 
decision makers, what assumptions are made about how the economic and social world functions 
- our ability to suggest concrete changes to the planning and policy making process that may lead 
to more equitable outcomes is severely curtailed.  
Indeed, two of the most influential books in urban planning provide in-depth 
investigations of plan implementation in a single city. Altshuler’s 1965 City Planning Process 
examined governance in the era of centralized planning and investment while Bent Flyvberg’s 
1998 Rationality and Power examined governance in the era of sustainability planning. Both 
depart from the behavior of local actors, conducting in-depth single case studies to understand 
the governance of urban transport in a given time period and both identified governance 
strategies that helped to explain the causal processes behind unanticipated observed outcomes. 
My work follows in their tradition, focusing on governance strategies surrounding an 
increasingly popular type of transit investment marked by decentralized implementation 
strategies, the modern streetcar.   
I employ an interpretivist approach in this project, that understands the purpose of social 
inquiry is to develop a better understanding of causal processes by examining how social actors 
construct and contest multiple truths in specific situations (Roth and Mehta 2002). Moving 
beyond observed correlations between variables, an interpretivist approach supports the 
development of theories and generalizations that are grounded in practice. Starting with the 
behavior, struggles and decision-making frameworks of planners, policy makers and elected 
officials, I investigate transportation planning and policy implementation from a perspective 
grounded in local experience. This helps to identify contextual factors shaping local decisions as 
well as discrepancies between normative planning prescriptions and the everyday practices of 
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local actors (Flyvbjerg 1998). A grounded-theory approach also facilitates the drawing of 
connections between local practices and extra-local forces to support broader theorizing 
(Burawoy 1998) about the state of urban transport governance in North American cities.      
 I complement this interpretivist approach with a mixed methods case study. Case study 
research investigates contemporary phenomenon, like the devolution of urban transport planning, 
“within its real-life context, where the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not 
clearly evident” using multiple sources of evidence (Yin 1984, 23). Case studies “trace out and 
recreate the mechanisms that connect events or relationships” (Lin 1998, 176) and are the 
“preferred strategy when “how” or “why” questions are being posed” (Yin 1984, 14). This 
approach to understanding complex social phenomena by “retaining the holistic and meaningful 
characteristics of real-life events” is particularly well suited for city and regional planning 
research (Yin 1984, 13). A mixed methods protocol allows for the use of multiple data sources, 
increasing the diversity of information collected and allowing room for multiple perspectives and 
competing interpretations of reality. This diversity of information is not intended to triangulate 
onto a single truth but rather seeks to illustrate the complexity, plurality of perspectives and 
conflicts that surround transit investments in specific contexts (Mathison 1988). By delving into, 
rather and oversimplifying, local context, this approach supports an evaluation of what strategies 
– financing, organizational arrangements, value-based arguments – carry power in terms of 
moving a plan from a vision to a reality (Flyvbjerg 1998) in particular historical-institutional 
environments.     
Case Selection  
This research focuses on a single case of urban transport investment but embraces the 
idea that relevant comparison cases should play an advisory role in identifying areas of inquiry 
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and providing broader context for the single case (Mukhija 2010). Case selection for a mixed-
methods investigation requires a non-random, information-oriented protocol (Flyvbjerg 2006). I 
began case selection by narrowing the potential list of urban transit investments to modern 
streetcar projects, “one of the most significant transportation developments in recent years” 
(Ramos-Santiago et al. 2015). Modern streetcars are rail-based transport systems that rely 
heavily on localized funding sources and management strategies (Brown et al. 2015) and as such, 
are a clear product of the devolution of transport governance.   
The term “streetcar” is used to refer to systems with considerably different characteristics 
(Golem and Smith-Heimer 2010). Some cities use the term to refer to light rail systems with 
dedicated rights of way (ex. Salt Lake City’s Sugarhouse Streetcar) while others use it to refer to 
systems that run on tires (i.e. Kenosha, WI) or only offer seasonal service tour services (i.e. 
Lowell, MA). I relied on the National Transit Database’s (NTD) definition of streetcars as “rail 
systems operating routes predominantly on streets in mixed-traffic…. powered by overhead 
catenaries and with frequent stops,” to compile a database of 60 modern streetcar projects 
operating, under construction, planned or proposed in 29 American cities (Exhibit 1; an earlier 
version is found in King and Fischer 2016). Aided by a collaborative Urban Transportation 
Research Center grant in the summer of 2014, I began tracking information on these 60 projects 
using local media coverage, government websites and academic and industry publications. This 
dataset informed case selection for this project but also serves the purpose of providing a 
national context for this project’s findings and underwriting the development of future research 
on devolution that is comparative in nature.  
Exhibit 1: Database of Streetcar Project in U.S. Cities 
Project Status         
Operating (17) Construction (3) Planned (11) Proposed (22) Cancelled (6)  
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"Construction" includes utility relocation, track placement or other major public works projects specifically 
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started construction; "Proposed" refers to projects that are undergoing formal review and evaluation, including 




  After assembling the streetcar dataset and compiling basic information on the projects, I 
developed three criteria to identify a set of comparative cases that could help define areas of 
inquiry, craft key questions to ask during interviews, identify the scope of stakeholders to 
interview and determine the types and sources of public data to analyze. My first criterion was 
that the streetcar project had to be in an urban region that did not have passenger rail. This was to 
ensure that the implementation process would represent something new to the local planning 
environment. Given that many cities without rail have plans for enhanced rail transit they have 
been unable to implement, this criterion also ensured that the cases would be able to tell me 
something about both the barriers to enhanced transit and the innovations employed to overcome 
those barriers. My second criterion was that the project had to be primarily financed with local 
revenue sources. Project financing is the lynchpin in urban transit investment, as many planned 
projects fail to materialize when financing cannot be secured, and understanding innovations in 
financing is key to understanding changes in local transport politics. My final criterion was that 
the streetcar project had a reasonable chance of starting operations before I planned to conclude 
the implementation portion of the research at the end of 2016. Applying these criteria to my 
master data set, I narrowed selection down to four core cases: Detroit, MI; Cincinnati, OH; 
Milwaukee, WI and Kansas City, MO.      
The four cases share contextual factors that are relevant for implementation. All four 
projects are located in the Midwest, an area of the country with ubiquitous automobile 
infrastructure and a strong aversion to taxation and public spending. All four cities are also the 
major “downtowns” – although not necessarily the primary population or employment centers – 
within their metropolitan regions. Finally, all four cities had local and regional plans for 
enhanced transit for several decades but with no success until their streetcar projects.  
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During 2014 I followed the four cases closely by monitoring popular press, government 
websites and local news coverage. I contacted one or two officials in each city to speak 
informally about their streetcar project. This was important for assessing the kind of access I 
would be able to gain with each case. In Detroit, access was complicated by the city’s 
bankruptcy proceedings, which both restricted the type of data the city was willing to provide 
and reduced the number of staff available for interviews. In addition, Detroit’s streetcar project 
was being spearheaded by a private investment group that did not adhere to the same standards 
of openness as the public sector. The controversial nature of the Cincinnati case made local 
actors less willing to speak candidly about the project while the legal challenges of utility 
companies in Milwaukee made it unclear whether the project would actually move forward. In 
contrast, contacts in Kansas City were very forthcoming about the project and seemed more than 
willing to provide me with data, internal working documents and candid assessments of the 
project. In Fall 2014, I selected Kansas City as my primary case study for the dissertation 
research. Given that Kansas City utilizes decentralized financing and provision strategies, it can 
be considered an instrumental case, or one that “helps us understand a specific issue, a case to 
best understand the problem” (Creswell 2007) of transport devolution and the institutional 
innovations shaping decentralization.    
The Kansas City Streetcar    
Kansas City, Missouri finalized plans for a streetcar investment in 2013 and began 
construction the following year. Primary data collection for this project occurred during the 18-
months prior to the line opening in May 2016. I conducted four site visits during these 18 
months, spending a total of 3 months in Kansas City during project implementation. During the 
time I was not on-site, I monitored project developments by tracking local media, reviewing 
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emails from local list-serves and staying in regular email contact with several key public-sector 
and media informants. In spring 2018, two years after the project opened, I conducted several 
follow-up interviews with selected informants and collected additional data on the streetcar’s 
performance and impacts.   
Data collection relied on a mixed methods approach. Qualitative methods included 
content analysis of local and regional planning documents from the previous 10 years and 
participant observation at city council meetings, planning visioning events, public outreach 
events, and public meetings related to the streetcar and to urban development more generally. I 
spent considerable time in the central city neighborhoods that would be served by the streetcar – 
including Crossroads and River Market – and adjacent neighborhoods like Brookside and Paseo 
Gateway.  I relied exclusively on the public transit system to navigate the city and documented 
the state of development in different neighborhoods using photographs and field notes. I also had 
many informal conversations about the streetcar and urban development more generally with 
transit riders, retail workers, restaurant staff and central city employees and residents. While the 
data from these informal conversations was not collected or analyzed systematically the 
conversations were useful for gauging how well the perspectives of my formal interview subjects 
reflected those of local residents in streetcar adjacent neighborhoods.   
My primary data collection instruments are semi-structured interviews conducted with 23 
stakeholders from city government, regional planning agencies, economic development agencies, 
Kansas City Streetcar Authority and transit advocacy organizations. Based on a stakeholder 
analysis informed by the four comparative cases, and flowcharts and planning documents from 
the Kansas City streetcar project, I initially identified a list of 28 stakeholders to contact for 
interviews. I also used a snowball sampling method to identify other actors - such as the outreach 
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coordinator for the streetcar construction company and a local transit advocate - whose 
involvement was identified as key to project implementation by local stakeholders. Despite 
several efforts, I was unable to secure interviews with staff at the local transit agency, KCATA, 
due to an intense re-organization effort that was underway at the time. I was also unable to 
contact two of the planning department staff involved with the project’s initial phases, one of 
whom no longer lived in Kansas City. In total, my data reflects interview responses from 23 
stakeholders whose affiliations are detailed below (Exhibit 2).  
 Exhibit 2: Interview Subjects by Organizational Affiliation 
Categories Positions/Title  
Elected Officials Mayor  
 City Councilmember, Transportation Committee 
Chair  
 
City Government Staff  
 
City Manager 
 Department of Public Works 
 Department of City Planning and Development (2) 
 KC Biz Care (Dept. Business License and 
Economic Development) 
 Dept. of Neighborhoods and Housing Services (2)  
 Transit Development District Project Facilitator (2) 
 
KC Housing Authority 
 
Director of Planning   
 
KC Economic Development Corporation 
 
Research Director 
 Development Services Specialist 
 Consultant 
 
KC Streetcar Authority  
 
Executive Director  
 Outreach Coordinator, Parsons   
 Board Member 
 
Mid-America Regional Council (MARC) 
 
President  
 Director of Transportation  
 
Transit Advocacy Organizations  
 
KC Transit Alliance, President 
 KC Transit Alliance, Board Member  
 KC Light Rail, Founder  
15 
 
Respondents were asked a series of open-ended questions about the streetcar project, with 
interviews lasting for a period of one to one and a half hours. Interviews were conducted in 
person in various locations around Kansas City and were recorded, with permission of the 
respondents. The goal of these interviews was to identify the major factors behind local 
decisions, including whether to build a streetcar line, where to site the project, how to fund 
capital and operational expenses and how to govern the streetcar project once it was operational 
(Exhibit 3). The open-ended format allowed respondents to talk about topics they thought were 
relevant for understanding the context of the streetcar project, and also laid the groundwork for 
longer standing relationships with key informants (Josselson 2013). For some respondents this 
resulted in long histories of development and infrastructure investment in the region while others 
recounted the decades of turmoil between communities located on either side of the state-line. 
This open-ended approach was incredibly useful for gaining a sense of the larger world views of 
streetcar stakeholders even if it did result in plenty of extraneous information. It also provided 
respondents with an opportunity to reflect on their involvement with the streetcar project and to 
ask questions of me about how their effort related to other streetcar systems in US cities.  
Exhibit 3: Semi-structured Interview Questions 
What is your formal job title? How long have you been at this position?  
What is your perspective on the streetcar project?  
What is the main role the streetcar is intended to serve in KCMO?  
What are the main impacts of the streetcar on downtown? On the city? On the bi-state region?  
At this point, do you see the project as a success or failure?  
What defines success or failure as the project moves towards completion and operation?  
In your opinion, who has the greatest ownership over the project, “whose” project is this?  
In your opinion, who are the main beneficiaries of the project?  
In your opinion, who are the main “players” in the streetcar project? 
What is your opinion on the use of the streetcar’s funding mechanism? 
What do you think about the Streetcar Authority governing structure?   
 
Additional Questions for Public Sector Staff: 
What is the role of your organization or department in the streetcar project?  
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Were there aspects (including governing and financing) that you wished turned out differently?  
What specific policies were not adopted that you thought would have strengthened the project?   
What prevented these policies from being adopted?  
What were the key points of conflict in the streetcar’s decision-making processes?  
 
I personally transcribed the 23 interviews and compiled respondents’ direct answers to four 
key questions:  
• Who are the main beneficiaries of the streetcar project?  
• How should we judge the streetcar’s success?  
• What is your opinion on the value capture funding mechanism?   
• What do you think about the Streetcar Authority structure?  
I then extracted key statements from each interview not directly related to these four 
questions and categorized them based on whether they referred to formal institutions (like state 
laws about financing or local land regulations) or more informal institutional structures (like the 
proper role of government, or the importance of economic and racial integration). This resulted 
in 744 statements (412 formal and 332 informal) across the 23 interview respondents. I 
organized these statements into 21 formal and 13 informal themes and further categorized the 21 
formal themes by whether they referred to issues residing at the federal, state or local level, to 
allow me to better assess the intergovernmental structures shaping transport planning and 
investment. After I began analyzing the themes in more detail, it became clear that my categories 
of formal and informal institutional structures could be easily refined into rules, regulatory 
processes, networks and organizational strategies, financial structures, and values and norms, i.e. 
more detailed institutional elements identified in the literature. Taking a broader approach, 
however, allowed for local context and interview data to drive the creation of themes and 
findings, which I view as a considerable asset.     
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More abstractly, I looked at the compiled themes in terms of institutional barriers and 
opportunities (Curtis and Low 2012). Barriers refer to structures with entrenched path 
dependencies that had historically inhibited change in urban transport policy. In the case of 
Kansas City, these included the lack of state funding for urban transit, a focus on environmental 
impacts and mode shifts in federal grant and loan programs and a local belief that transit is only a 
social service for poor people, among others. From a local perspective, barriers were elements 
that needed to be surmounted by local problem solving and innovation. These local solutions 
reflect institutional opportunities for change that are both a result of larger global changes (i.e. 
generational change, deindustrialization), changes to intergovernmental structures (i.e. new 
federal grant programs like TIGER) as well as a product of local actor’s innovations in 
institutional design.               
I complemented the interview data with content analysis of local and regional planning 
documents, participant observation at city council and neighborhood planning meetings, and 
analysis of local media outlets. I obtained quantitative data from government sources such as the 
U.S. Census, Kansas City Department of Finance, Kansas City Department of Planning, Mid-
America Regional Council, and the Economic Development Council of Kansas City to conduct 
geospatial analysis of trends in development, land use and public spending across the city. I was 
also able to obtain results of a survey of 35 developers doing projects in the streetcar financing 
district that was conducted by the Kansas City Economic Development Corporation in spring 
2015 (Appendix B).   
These are the data sources that ground the thick description of Kansas City’s modern 
streetcar investment provided in this manuscript. I present research findings as a narrative, or a 
story - “perhaps our most fundamental form for making sense of experience” (Flyvbjerg 2001, 
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132) - about streetcar implementation in a specific context. The work is structured to allow 
theoretical generalizations related to the politics of transit financing and governance in an era of 
decentralization while also exploring the role of values and power in the planning process. 
Before turning to the Kansas City case, I provide a more robust discussion of the utility of 
institutional analysis for understanding the politics of urban transport investment in American 








Rules, Resources and Realities:  
An Institutional Analysis of Urban Transport Investment 
 
The provision of urban transport in American cities has vacillated over the past century 
between decentralized and centralized approaches. Although current trends toward 
decentralization are influenced by global forces (Graham and Marvin 2001), how transport 
devolves - through what mechanisms and to serve what purposes - is determined by institutional 
structures, or the informal and formal structures of collective decision-making. In this essay I use 
institutional theory and analysis to show how the institutional strategies employed by local actors 
during the 20th century had divergent consequences for road and transit investment. I begin the 
chapter with a discussion of the importance of institutions in transport planning and a summary 
of the institutional theory I employ to understand the politics of contemporary transport. I then 
use this institutional framework to put current trends of decentralization into a historical context, 
highlighting the main institutional structures influencing contemporary transport investment and 
providing a new framework for evaluating transport planning in American cities.       
Institutional Analysis  
Urban transport investment is a political activity whose outcomes are explained by 
governance, or the “processes of interaction and decision-making among actors involved in a 
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collective problem” (Hufty 2011, 405). In recent decades, the devolution of transport investment 
and policy to regional and local governments (Wachs 2003) has spawned multiple strategies for 
urban transport investment and provision. How are we to evaluate the development, deployment 
and consequences of an emerging and diverse landscape of urban transport governance in a 
systematic and theoretically informed manner? In the following section, I illustrate the utility of 
institutional analysis for understanding, shaping and critically evaluating contemporary transport 
planning.   
Public policies, including those related to transportation, are the product of institutional 
structures, or the rules, norms, strategies, networks and laws that influence individual and 
collective behavior (Vigar 2002). Institutions are not just the scaffolding through which public 
policy passes; decision-making structures, including the incentives and disincentives provided 
for particular courses of action, matter considerably for explaining policy outcomes. Institutional 
analysis helps to unpack complex governance processes by focusing attention on the structuring 
forces at work in policy formation and implementation. By foregrounding the role of formal and 
informal structures, it helps illuminate the processes behind both change and stability in urban 
transport investment (Curtis and Low 2012).  
With its embrace of complexity, an institutional framework is particularly well suited to 
examine governance processes that involve multiple public and private sector actors (Peters 
1992) and whose outcomes vary considerably by context, like urban transportation (Vigar 2002). 
Although institutions have not occupied a prominent position in planning theory and education, 
they are paramount in urban planning practice (Alexander 2000). Indeed, “institutions matter 
considerably for planners” (Bolan 2000, 36), as they include the primary tools (i.e. regulations, 
arguments, funding, coalition building) planners use to achieve policy goals (Guailini 2001). 
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Institutional design, the “creation or transformation of institutions…involved in a common 
undertaking” is a key element of planning practice (Alexander 2005, 206) and is even considered 
by some to be planning (Innes 1995, 140).     
An institutional framework is also useful for understanding local responses to global 
processes, like the devolution of (transport) governance. Examining the development and 
deployment of institutional strategies helps identify the structuring forces that are actively 
constructed and revealed by formal and informal rules, the deployment of resources and 
stakeholders’ frames of reference (Giddens 1984). Although these structuring forces exhibit path 
dependence, they are inherently malleable (Low et al 2003). Thus, understanding how 
institutions emerge, sustain and impact policy processes is essential to effectively facilitating 
change. Indeed, from an institutional perspective, policy development and implementation – like 
structure and agency - are analytically inseparable (Vigar 2002). More concretely, the 
institutional policy process includes: 
The manner in which problems get defined as political problems, the remedies 
government devises for dealing with them, the implementation of those solutions, the 
impact of those supposed remedies on the problems and the revision of the remedies in 
light of various groups’ perceptions of their desirability. (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 
1993, pg. xi)   
This expansive understanding of policy goes beyond a concern with technical regulations 
and formal processes to recognize that “the struggle for power is a struggle for setting the 
discourse in which a problem is framed” (Parsons 1995, 152). The discursive thread of 
institutional analysis, concerned with how stakeholders construct their policy worlds, illuminates 
the ways that informal norms and practices underpin the evaluation of policy choices and 
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everyday planning activity. Narrative or discursive components displayed through interaction in 
planning processes also allow for the deconstruction of bias and power structures (De Neufville 
and Barton 1987; Healey 1992), with implications for rethinking the practices of participatory 
and deliberative democracy and the potential of planning in fostering their progress (Gualini 
2001).  
Discursive changes alone do not produce material results, as illustrated by the challenges 
of implementing sustainable development and social justice planning ideals in transport (Banister 
2005; Grengs 2005; Loukaitou-Sideris and Banerjee 2000). Institutional analysis recognizes the 
importance of technical regulations and resources, as well as discursive structures, for explaining 
policy outcomes and processes. Indeed, it is the interplay of institutional strategies that is 
paramount, as particular regulations can undermine or support discursive arguments or new 
organizational arrangements and vice versa (Curtis and Low 2012). Context and history are also 
important elements of an institutional framework as historically derived institutional processes in 
the economic and political organization of transportation have had an important – if under 
recognized - impact on the social and spatial structure of cities (Yago 1983). In sum, institutional 
analysis allows for a holistic approach to evaluating the transport policy process by combining 
formal and informal structures into a single analytic lens that recognizes - rather than reduces - 
the importance of context and history in contemporary policy outcomes.   
In this essay, I use the institutional triangle of Rules, Resources and Realities (Exhibit 4; 
derived from Giddens 1984) to better understand the structuring forces shaping, and being 
shaped by, transport investment in American cities. Rules refers to the formal institutional 
structures at play, such as federal or state legislation, bureaucratic organization and local 
regulations. Resources refers to the allocation of funds for particular purposes including what 
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types of investments warrant public funding as well as how funds are raised and dispersed. 
Financing is particularly important as the modern geography of urban transport can largely be 
understood by “following the money” (Taylor 2004, 295). An examination of resources also 
helps us better understand the informal structures at work, as resource allocation is as an 
important indicator of the dominant frames of reference at a particular time (Vigar 2002). The 
third element, Realities, refers to the larger mental models of decision-makers and includes their 
normative justifications for particular policy actions as well as their general beliefs about how 
the social, economic and political worlds function.     




In the next section, I use this institutional triangle to situate the devolution of urban 
transport planning in a wider governance context. Although both roads and transit investment 
followed a similar centralizing - decentralizing arc, I argue that institutional trajectories 
established in the late 19th and early 20th century were instrumental for establishing the primacy 
of the automobile and the decline of urban transit. I show how institutional designs – or the 
combination of rules, resources and realities - employed to implement urban transport over the 
past century have created path dependencies that shape contemporary approaches to road and 
transit investment. Devolution is subtly changing the surface transportation sector “in ways that 
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have not been adequately noted by transportation analysts and scholars” (Goldman and Wachs 
2003, 19), but it is also influenced by institutional baggage and barriers created during the 
process of centralization. This essay helps us better understand the governance context in which 
devolution is occurring in American cities so we can more properly assess the behavior of local 
actors.   
An Institutional History of Urban Transportation   
Over the past 150 years, changes in the institutional structures of urban transport have 
contributed to the ascent of automobility and the decline of transit in American cities. 
Organizational and financial strategies employed to build, manage and operate urban transit 
systems during its infancy and adolescence incentivized decision-makers to leverage transit 
investment for its second-order impacts of real estate development, utility expansion and 
promotion of automobile products, rather than building stable and sustainable transit systems. As 
urban transit joined roads as a public responsibility in the 1960s, the structures local actors 
employed to make transit ‘public’ and the resources provided by the federal government created 
incentives for overcapitalization in mass transit investments that furthered hindered urban 
transit’s ability to compete with the automobile. The institutional history of urban transport that 
follows is structured around Rule, Resources and Frames of References, and followed by a 
discussion of the institutional path dependencies shaping contemporary planning practices.  
Rules  
Formal structures of transport decision-making range in scope from bureaucratic 
organization to laws about union work rules to regulations about road design. In this section I 
focus on the broadest of formal institutions1, examining the role of organizational decision-
                                                          
1 This review is limited to a general discussion due to its national focus and relevance as background material. In 
the other two papers I more specifically identify a range of formal rules shaping contemporary transport planning.     
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making processes – i.e. who is involved, how are they held accountable, what concerns are 
considered, over what geography – on urban transport provision. In the late 19th century, both 
road and transit investments were a local responsibility. Road investment was a general 
government activity, paid for with local taxes, but urban transit was primarily a private endeavor. 
Under the regulated utility model – popular at the turn of the century with progressive reformers 
– local governments issued monopolistic streetcar franchises to private actors who built and 
operated streetcar systems. Road investment decisions were made by local, democratically 
accountable governments while urban transit investment was decided by private boards largely 
composed of real estate interests and land speculators who used streetcar systems to increase the 
value of their land holdings (Warner 1962, Crump 1962). Concerned primarily with expanding 
the urban footprint and constrained by the framework of regulated competition, private streetcar 
operators of the 1890s overcapitalized future earnings and over expanded physical facilities 
(Jones 1985).  
By World War 1, urban transport involved more centralized governance. Although roads 
were still a local responsibility, investment decisions increasingly involved higher levels of 
government. State-level roads programs – backed by fuel tax revenue – approached road 
planning and design from the perspective of highway engineers who viewed roads solely as 
traffic conduits (Dimento and Ellis 2013), marking a change from previous decades when local 
control emphasized the integration of different modes of mobility and nurtured the dynamic 
relationship between land use and transport (Norton 2008). Urban transit systems also became 
more centralized as they joined state-based public utility commissions that combined electric, 
water and transport into a single regulated utility, providing new sources of capital and 
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protection from local political pressure for improved service2. By 1931 electric utility holding 
companies – organized as state-regulated public service commissions - had a controlling interest 
in 50% of American transit companies, carrying 80% of revenue passengers (Solomon and 
Saltzman 1972). Urban streetcar investments allowed utility companies to divert their earnings3 
while also providing a stimulus for land development that expanded demand for utilities, 
continuing the pattern of overcapitalization and overexpansion that previously hindered urban 
transit (Jones 1985).  
State governments remained heavily involved with urban road building for the remainder 
of the 20th century, but urban transit’s alliance with state-based utility companies was short-lived. 
In 1935, the federal government’s Public Utility Holding Company Act limited public service 
commissions to a single, integrated operation, forcing utility companies to divest their transport 
holdings. The impact on streetcar company ownership was shift and dramatic: By 1940 public 
utility holding companies controlled a stake in transit companies that amounted to only 14% of 
the nation’s passengers, a 66% percent decline from 9 years earlier (Solomon and Saltzman 
1972). By 1947, National City Lines (a holding company of General Motors and Firestone 
Rubber Company) and Pacific Lines (a holding company of Mack Truck, Phillips Petroleum and 
Standard Oil) controlled 46 transit operations in most of the largest American cities4. Urban road 
                                                          
2 Not all urban transit systems were privately owned and operated. New York and Boston used public bonds to 
finance the construction of rapid transit systems in the 1890s but leased the operating contracts to private companies. 
San Francisco residents approved a municipal rail line down Geary St in 1909, converting the privately-operated line 
into the city’s first municipal railway line (MUNI). Other cities purchased privately-owned streetcar systems that 
were in dire financial straits. The Seattle Electric Railway Company sold its local lines to the city of Seattle in 1918 
while residents in Detroit passed a bond authorization in 1920 to purchase the fledging Detroit United Railways 
System. Like their private counterparts, publicly owned streetcars relied on fare payments to cover capital and 
operational expenses. These examples are outliers; given that streetcar systems existed in most US cities (Warner 
1962, Jones 1985), public ownership remained an anomaly in urban transit before the mid-20th century.    
3 Regulatory frameworks for utilities required they show limited short-term profits; investing profits into streetcar 
systems allowed them to meet this criterion without lowering rates or changing their business operations. 
4 This important switch in ownership is often termed the “Great Streetcar Conspiracy”, representing a view that 
automobile industries conspired to destroy a healthy and fiscally sound urban transit industry (Snell 1974). This 
viewpoint has been largely debunked, as the history of urban transit shows that the industry suffered from decline, 
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investment, in contrast, benefitted substantially from the involvement of state agencies as well as 
federal road building programs during the Great Depression. The improved quality and quantity 
of roads influenced transit operations, as many providers shifted from rail-based streetcars to 
road-based buses (Bauer 1939)5. Like the real estate and utility interests before them, automobile 
holding companies saw urban transit as a tool for investing their accruing capital and as a 
strategy to promote the use of their primary products (i.e. automobiles, tires and fuel). As a 
result, many transit operators substituted buses on routes whose ridership warranted rail transit6, 
facilitating network expansion but also creating substantial quality of service issues that 
continued to put transit at a long-term disadvantage (Saltzman 1992).   
Urban Transport continued its path toward centralization in the decades following the 
second world war. Road investment accelerated, aided by and facilitating the post-war trends of 
increasing car ownership and low-density suburban development. Congress’ passage of the 1944 
Federal-Aid Highway Act, authorizing a 40,000-mile interstate highway system, cemented 
federal involvement in urban road investment for the next half century. This drastic expansion of 
centralized road planning and financing relied on existing organizational structures in the form of 
state road authorities and the federal Bureau of Public Roads, avoiding the need to create new 
organizational arrangements and facilitating the implementation of the Federal Interstate 
program. 
                                                          
disinvestment and financial instability several decades before being taken over by automobile holding companies. 
Jones (1985) provides a more historically accurate perspective, categorizing the National City Lines controversy as a 
corporate market-breaching and market-cornering strategy rather than an elaborate conspiracy to destroy the last 
competitive threat to the automobile. 
5 The Fair Labor Standards Act (1938), which established a five-day work week, gave further impetus for bus 
conversion as the loss of a work day was more punishing for rail lines whose financial models required heavier 
patronage.   
6 While streetcar routes were cheaper to operate than buses, they were considerably more expensive to expand. 
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Urban transit did not benefit from the same organizational continuity as roads; most 
transit systems approached the mid-century on a search for new owners as automobile holding 
companies, a target of federal anti-trust legislation in the 1950s, were forced to divest their 
transit holdings.  Lacking private investors willing to take ownership of divested transit systems, 
local governments faced the option of either abandoning or taking public control of existing 
urban transit systems7. Many chose the latter - at the end of World War II 20% of the nation’s 
transit ridership occurred on publicly owned systems8 but by 1960 properties in public ownership 
accounted for nearly 50% of the industry’s ridership (Jones 1985). Public ownership continued to 
accelerate; between 1965 and 1974, the number of publicly owned transit systems increased from 
58 to 308 (Hess and Lombardi 2005).  
State-created regional transit agencies were the preferred organizational structures for 
newly public urban transit systems. As single purpose public authorities, these transit agencies 
limited their scope of concern to transit management and investment. Although urban transport 
was now publicly controlled, responsibility for roads and transit remained split between 
government actors. The first pieces of federal legislation to address urban transit – i.e. the 1961 
Housing Act, and the 1964 Urban Mass Transportation Act – were housed in the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development. Road investment, originally a concern of the Department of 
Agriculture, was elevated to its own cabinet-level department with Congress’s creation of the 
Department of Transportation (DOT)9 and National Highway Safety Bureau in 1966, which 
creating centralized bureaucracies to facilitate road planning and investment.  
                                                          
7 In larger cities, the public option was hardly an “option” as leaders were under increased rhetorical pressure to 
stem the tide of decline in population, employers and investment brought by suburbanization and maintaining transit 
services was viewed as a key responsibility of public sector actors under the welfare model of government.  
8 Only five major properties were publicly owned at the end of World War II (Jones 1985) 
9 Notably, the original structure of the DOT did not include urban transit which was organized under the Department 
of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), reflecting the view that urban transit was largely an urban issue and 
further cementing the separation of road and transit planning, despite their complimentary nature.  
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Although transport policy was split at the federal level, regional integration was 
incentivized by Congress’ Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966 
which created area-wide planning agencies to facilitate metropolitan decision-making that united 
roads, urban renewal and transit investment. These Metropolitan Planning Organizations (MPOs) 
were aimed at ensuring that federally-funded projects and programs adhered to the “3-C” 
planning process – i.e. planning that is continuing (not project specific), cooperative (involves a 
variety of actors) and comprehensive (considers a wide range of concerns). Federally 
incentivized metropolitan planning organizations (MPOs) were complemented, in many cities, 
by regional transit agencies, reinforcing the importance of a regional approach to urban 
transport10. Regional approaches reflected a view - popular at the time - that urban governance 
should be streamlined and organized into a few tiers of authority to enhance efficiency (Wood 
1961). Although backed by federal policy, MPOs were state enabled organizations whose 
format, scope and access to resources differed considerably across urban areas and made regional 
approaches more effective in some areas than others.     
Since the late 1960s, federal transportation policy has sought to integrate urban road and 
transit investment and planning more explicitly. In 1968 the Johnson administration relocated the 
Urban Mass Transit Administration into the Department of Transportation, marking the first time 
that both roads and transit were combined into a single federal department. In 1982 Congress 
passed the Surface Transportation Assistance Act that unified highway, transit and safety public 
works under a single policy framework, creating the nation’s first intermodal transportation 
policy. The Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA) of 1991 sought to (again) 
                                                          
10 In the early 1960s, the prevailing opinion was not that America had too much government but that too many 
governments made effective governance impossible; the scholarly critique was led by Robert Wood’s 1400 
governments (1961). Solution called for streamlining government and organizing a few tiers of authority. 
30 
 
empower regional metropolitan planning organizations (MPOs). This time the federal push for 
regionalism was less concerned with efficient governance and more focused on countering the 
growing disparities between cities and suburbs by helping localities adopt common policies that 
set the region up for economic prosperity (Rusk 1993, Peirce, Hall and Johnson 1993).  
MPOs are major players in contemporary transport planning and investment but they vary 
considerably in their organizational structures and power (Sciara and Wachs 2007). In 2012, 
there were 342 metropolitan planning organizations in the United States (Grant et al. 2012); 
some are organized as Councils of Governments (COGs), staffed by elected officials from 
regional municipalities while others are composed of independent boards appointed by elected 
officials, and one is directly elected (i.e. Portland, OR). Some are limited to a single county 
(Maricopa County, AZ) while other MPOs encompass multiple counties (Chicago, New York) or 
cross state boundaries (Kansas City, MO). The organizational structure of MPOs explains their 
varying levels of effectiveness in coordinating regional action for urban transport investment 
(Sciara and Wachs 2007). Although MPOs remain the federal-preferred structures for transport 
investment, some local governments have chosen to eschew the regional approach, vesting 
responsibility for new transit investments with city-based non-profits or government 
departments. Thus, organizational strategy appears to have come full circle, inching back to local 
solutions, but carrying the institutional history of 20th century centralization.     
Resources 
Urban transport organizations - whether public or private, federal or local - are only 
effective if they have adequate resources to fulfill their missions. Organization and finance are 
inseparable (Sclar, Lönnroth, and Wolmar 2014; Eno 2014) as urban fiscal problems – like 
transport funding – result from skewed resource distribution and political barriers to change, not 
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long-run resource scarcity (Meltsner 1974). This section discusses the financing of urban 
transport in American cities over the past 150 years, again using the juxtaposition of roads and 
transit to illustrate how resource strategies have impacted transport planning and investment. I 
discuss financing along two fronts: revenue-raising strategies and revenue allocation strategies.      
Revenue-raising strategies 
Urban transport revenue raising strategies (Exhibit 5) can be categorized as user pays, 
everyone pays, and non-user beneficiary pays (Nakagawa and Matsunaka 1997). User-pay 
strategies charge fees that are proportional to the burden a user has on a transport system, 
mimicking the pricing of services for private goods. Everyone-pay strategies rely on revenue 
collected from general taxation and have traditionally been used to fund public goods, like 
education and national defense. A third strategy, non-user beneficiary pays, can involve public 
mechanisms (like special assessments) or private sources of revenue (like investors), but in either 
case raises revenue in proportion to the benefit that a non-user receives from an urban transport 
investment (like increases to land value or returns on investments).  
Exhibit 5: Revenue Raising Strategies for Urban Transport 
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From the 19th century until the Great Depression, American cities largely relied on 
general property tax revenues (a form of everyone pays financing) to build and maintain major 
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thoroughfares and levied special assessments (a form of non-user beneficiary pays financing) on 
land owners to pay for secondary or tertiary road investment (Taylor 2004). The 1916 Federal 
Aid Roads Act expanded everyone pays financing for roads, providing a 50% federal match for 
state road projects. User pays approaches to road investment emerged in the 1920s in the form of 
state gasoline taxes and by 1925 all but four states were relying on user fees to fund road 
projects. When property tax revenues – the primary source for local road funding - declined 
during the Great Depression city and counties successfully petitioned states for access to fuel tax 
revenues for road investment (Burch 1962, Jones 1989). Following World War II, the federal 
government expanded user pay financing by creating the Highway Trust Fund (HTF) in 1956 as 
a dedicated revenue source for the government’s $25 Billion Interstate program, and tying 
federal gas tax revenues to road projects for the first time since its creation in 1932. By the mid-
20th century road investment was benefitting from a combination of user, and everyone pays 
financing (Exhibit 6).    
Exhibit 6: Revenue Sources for Urban Transport, by Mode and Period  
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Expanding revenue sources for urban roads contrasted with urban transit (Exhibit 6, 
Exhibit 7). Urban transit was primarily funded by user fees, in the form of transit fares, with 
additional capital financing coming from non-user beneficiaries in the form of private investors. 
Importantly, however, most transit operators had little control over fare rates. In exchange for 
franchise agreements that allowed streetcar operators to use the public right of way (and forbid 
the use of competitive services like jitneys), local governments required streetcar operators to 
keep fares at five cents (Jones 1985). From the beginning of electrification in 1886 until 1915, 
the lack of inflation allowed electric railways to survive despite fixed fares (Norton 2008) but as 
costs escalated prior to the first World War, transit operators faced considerable financial strain 
as they found themselves unable to raise the price of fares to cover the cost of operations, pay 
dividends to shareholders and meet bond interest payments. Although new organizational 
strategies provided urban transit with access to resources in the form of non-user beneficiary 
financing from utility companies and automobile holding companies, transit continued to be 
managed as a private enterprise expected to recover the full expense of day-to-day operations 
from passenger revenue (Jones 1985). As ridership continued to decline in the post war years, 
spurred by a lack of investment, urban transit operations found themselves in a downward spiral 
they were ill-prepared to stop.   
New sources of transit financing became available in the mid-20th century. Local 
governments had been investing in urban transit since the Great Depression, but by the mid-
1960s the increasing number of publicly owned systems combined with the escalating costs of 
operating poorly planned and maintained investments to spur a push for more centralized 
funding. The 1961 Housing Act and the 1964 Urban Mass Transportation Act marked a turn in 
urban transit financing: not only had revenue sources become more centralized in state and 
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federal governments, but urban transit was – like roads had been for decades – now funded using 
a combination of user, and everyone pays financing. The use of everyone pays financing 
expanded locally as well in the late 1960s as metropolitan areas created local revenue streams to 
keep struggling public transit systems afloat and fund new capital investments. Known as Local 
Option Transportation Taxes (LOTTs), or taxes that vary “within a state, with revenues 
controlled at the local or regional level and earmarked for transportation-related purposes” 
(Goldman and Wachs 2003, 21), these included mortgage recording, payroll and sales taxes.   
 
Exhibit 7: Transport and Transit Spending As % of GDP 
 
 
In 1982 Congress passed the Surface Transportation Assistance Act, raising the federal 
gas tax by120 percent and, for the first time, earmarking 1 cent for transit programs. The use of 
federal gas tax revenues for non-road investments marked a shift from conceiving of the 
transport system as a tangle of separate and competing components, like roads and transit, to 
viewing modes as pieces of an interrelated network that combined to influence travel behavior, 
and development patterns. Despite new federal sources, localities still needed more revenue to 
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meet local demand for transport. In the 1990s city and counties – aided by state enabling 
legislation - drastically expanded the use of LOTTs11, marking a “a quiet revolution in 
transportation financing” (Wachs 2003).  
LOTTs tend to rely heavily on everyone pays financing strategies in the form of sales 
taxes (Goldman and Wachs 2003) but during the past decade cities have increasingly turned to 
value capture – a type of LOTT that targets the non-user beneficiary – to raise revenue for urban 
transit investment (Istrate and Levinson 2012). Notably, the non-user beneficiary strategies that 
dominated 19th century transport investment were displaced during the 20th century by everyone 
pays strategies, in both roads and transit. In the past two decades, as financing responsibilities 
have increasing devolved to regional and local governments, non-user beneficiary financing is 
again becoming a vital strategy for local transport revenues.  
Resource Allocation Strategies 
Revenue raising strategies provide only half of the urban transport financing story, as 
revenue allocation strategies for roads and transit significantly shaped investment in the decades 
following World War II. Federal money for highways required cities to relinquish control over 
urban expressway development (Brown et al 2009, Jones 1989) while the “structure of the 
interstate funding program discouraged the kind of multimodal expressways envisioned by the 
early metropolitan transportation planners to circulate and distribute traffic in cities” (Taylor 
2004, 313). Existing one-to-one matching formulas for federal aid were changed to 9 to 1 to 
encourage localities to prioritize Interstate programs over competing local transport needs 
(Taylor 2004).  
                                                          
11 During the 1990s, nine states authorized expansion of sales taxes for public transit, eight targeted them for 
roads and capital improvements 
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During the first half of the 20th century, revenue allocation for privately owned urban 
transit systems adhered to a strategy of over capitalization, as private owners used transit 
investments to expand the urban footprint to achieve goals that primarily benefitted private 
actors. As transit increasingly became a public responsibility in the 1960s, the small number of 
public systems provided a slim body of local administrative experience on which to design and 
execute federal funding (Jones 1985). The 1961 Housing Act inaugurated a small, low-interest 
loan program for acquisitions, capital improvements, research and planning while the 1964 
Urban Mass Transportation Act provided capital grants to replace obsolete equipment, conduct 
research and fund demonstration projects that allowed localities to experiment with new transit 
technologies, service and marketing innovations (Ortner and Wachs 1979). But despite most 
cities’ reliance on bus service, federal aid was imprinted with a big-city, commuter-rail 
perspective (Jones 1985), creating a bias toward new equipment and politically visible projects 
over cost-effective operations (Taylor 2004). Local governments were not necessarily prepared 
to handle their new responsibilities, becoming eligible for intergovernmental grants before they 
had given serious study to service options and mobility needs (Jones 1985). Although federal 
expenditures on transit never amounted to a substantial percentage of federal GDP (Exhibit 7), 
the appeal of ‘free money’ in the form of federal capital grants incentivized localities to adopt 
capital heavy transport policies.         
Capital grants may have facilitated automobility, but they did the opposite for urban 
transit, at least in part due to the different resource needs of roads and transit. Mass transit 
systems have substantial operational expenses while operational expenses for automobile travel 
are largely paid by individuals. Although Congress allocated monies for transit capital 
investments in the 1960s, they resisted providing funds for operations under the logic that locally 
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sourced operating funds incentivized the efficient use of federal grants. The federal focus on 
capital investments and expansion led some localities - like early land speculators before them - 
to invest in overly elaborate rail systems (i.e. Washington D.C. and Atlanta, GA) while others 
skimped on maintenance, using federal programs to replace rather than repair capital components 
of the transit system (Ortner and Wachs 1979). Capital-grant fueled expansion combined with 
local resistance to increasing transit fares to push urban transit into further financial disarray.  
Local pressure for operating assistance led to the passage of the 1974 Urban Mass 
Transportation Act, the first piece of legislation to provide federal operating subsidies for urban 
transit. Relying on formula funding (rather than competitive grants), it allocated monies to urban 
areas with populations greater than 50,000 and provided localities with discretion to use funds 
for capital or operational expenses. Although sorely needed - fare revenues covered only about 
half of operational expenses in 1975 (Taylor 2004) - federal operating subsidies opened a 
Pandora’s box; smaller, often suburban systems used the influx of federal funding to expand 
their operations, causing federal expenditures to soar from $300 million in 1975 to 1.1 billion in 
1980 (Taylor 2004). When the quality of urban transit services did not improve, many analysts, 
members of Congress and Reagan administration officials concluded that escalating costs 
primarily benefitted operators and their employers rather than riders and residents (Li and Taylor 
1998; Pickrell 1986), underwriting policies to reduce subsidies and privatize operations.   
Today, federal funding for local investment is managed by multiple agencies within the 
U.S. Department of Transportation (USDOT) who allocate about $40 billion each year to 
different transport modes (e.g. marine, air travel, highway and transit) using formulas based on 
population, state gas tax revenue, roadway conditions and transit ridership (GAO 2011). Transit 
capital investment, a long-standing exception to formula funding, relies on a competitive grant 
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process administered by the Federal Transit Administration’s “New Starts” program, and since 
2009, also through the Transportation Investment Generating Economic Recovery (TIGER) 
program administered directly by the Department of Transportation. New Starts Grants are 
geared toward expensive investments (i.e. $300 million) that influence commuter travel behavior 
while TIGER grant allocations are geared toward smaller scale road and transit investments that 
have economic development impacts (Ohland 2004). Both programs place a strong emphasis on 
local funding matches (GAO 2011), making local project financing a key determinant in federal 
transport allocations (Lowe 2013) and enhancing the popularity of local option transportation 
taxes (Wachs 2003).   
Resources for urban transport investment were initially derived from local sources – i.e. 
taxes for roads, users and private investors for transit – but centralized in tandem with 
organizational changes throughout the 20th century. Federal funding for roads prioritized the 
building of limited access highways, expanding the national road network and bulldozing large 
swaths of urban land to facilitate automobility through and to the urban core. Federal funding for 
transit lagged roads but also had a strong focus on capital investments, a perspective that served 
to hinder transit, as operators were incentivized to focus on capital investment and expansion 
over effective operations. This review illustrates how urban transport has never been self-
financing. Although road investment has traditionally been discussed as a self-financing 
investment, paid for by federal, state and local vehicle related taxes, transportation-related 
revenue sources have never covered the full expense of road investment (Taylor 2004). As 
revenue raising and allocation decisions have been devolving to regional and local actors in 
recent decades, the popularity of non-user beneficiary financing has increased. Thus, like 
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organizational strategies, resources for urban transport are also returning to their local 
orientation.   
Realities 
Policymakers’ realities, or frames of reference, compose the third and final vortex of the 
institutional prism that explains urban transport investment (Exhibit 4). Frames of reference are 
exhibited through discourses that include general claims about how the world works, as well as 
more policy relevant concerns of what constitutes a public problem. Discourses are interwoven 
with values and norms and are inter-subjectively generated around particular policy domains 
(Curtis and Low 2012). Multiple discursive structures exist within a single policy domain - like 
urban transit - but some inevitably carry more political weight, and are better able to mobilize 
resources for particular actions in particular contexts. Once they are established, “discourse 
networks ensure that influential persons think and speak in harmony when it comes to 
discussions of [what may be] extremely controversial” policy solutions (Low et al. 2003). This 
section reviews the dominant discourses surrounding American urban transport since the 19th 
century (Exhibit 8).   
Transport investment was initially concerned with accommodating 19th century 
urbanization. Enhanced road and transit networks provided a decentralizing force that was a key 
strategy in local efforts to lower densities and promote real estate development away from 
congested slums (King 2011). Efficiency and mobility were the primary discourses surrounding 
urban transport (Stough and Reitveld 1997), but investments were also justified for their 
economic development impacts (Warner 1962). Transport investments made the city more 
attractive for development by reducing the problems caused by congestion while transit 
investment in particular served as “physical evidence that [a] community was a member of the 
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‘growth club’ of towns and cities of economic importance” (Jones 1985, 31). Road and transit 
investments were made under the “Build it and They will Come” assumption that new 
infrastructure inevitably attracts new users. Although this proved to be true for urban transit 
during the 19th century, the growing popularity of the automobile and the low-density 
development that accompanied it severely curtailed transit’s ability to attract new riders or shape 
development during the 20th century.   
The different organizational approaches to roads and transit reflected and impacted 
discourses about the proper role of the public sector. Early operations established urban transit as 
a profit-oriented endeavor that covered expenses with non-public revenue sources like user fees 
and private investment, while the difficulties of charging the general public to use roads helped 
to frame them as a public good that deserved public funding (Barrett 1983). This speaks to 
broader discourses about “public versus private roles, taxes versus user fees” that “are at the 
heart of urban transportation finance” (Taylor 2004, 295). In societies like the United States that 
embrace the market distribution principle above all else, public transport that provides a high 
level of accessibility is only provided where it is most cost effective (Curtis and Low 2012). This 
mindset is behind efforts in the 1980s to increase public contracting to private operators and in 
the 1990s to privately finance new toll roads (Taylor 2004). In contrast, societies with a deep 
belief in the collective, like Zurich, Switzerland, place a higher priority on providing ubiquitous 
service regardless of the cost effectiveness of the system (Stough and Reitveld 1997). Road 
investment is often framed as self-financing on the basis that gas and vehicle related taxes and 
fees provide adequate revenue while transit is consistently lamented for its high subsidies. In 
reality, however, vehicle related taxes have never covered the full expense of road investment 
(Taylor 2004) and automobility has been heavily subsidized through the provision of free 
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parking (Shoup 2005). Despite these facts, discourses of roads being deserving of public 
investment and transit being a privately financed endeavor persist.        
Exhibit 8: Discourses of Urban Transport Investment 
 
Discourse Defining Logic Dominant Period 
Build it and They Will Come 
(Accommodating Growth in 
the 1900s)  
Infrastructure investments – both roads 
and transit – help address urban 
congestion by facilitating land 
development outside the urban core that 
decentralizes the urban population; 
Efficiency and Mobility prioritized.   
1800s – 1910 
Roads as Public Good, 
Transit as Private Good; 
Modal Competition 
Urban transit is a profit-oriented 
endeavor paid for with non-public 
revenue sources; Roads are a public 
good that deserves public funding 
1800s – 1960s 
Building out of Congestion 
(Accommodating Growth in 
the Automobile Era) 
Traffic congestion inevitably results 
from economic growth; Roads are 
necessary to alleviate congestion; Public 
transport cannot solve inter-urban 
congestion problems. Forecasts of road 
traffic suggest that new investments and 
expansions are needed; Efficiency and 
Mobility prioritized  
1910 – 1960 
Roads for National Defense National road network facilitates disaster 
response, troop mobilization; Federal 
needs trump local concerns  
1920 – 1950 
Roads as Public Service; 
Transit as Social Service 
Transit investments are necessary to 
serve transit dependent populations 
while roads investments benefit the 
public at large; Equity prioritized  
1960 – today 
Balanced Transport; Modal 
Integration  
Emphasizes the need to balance 
environmental, economic and social 
concerns, plan roads and transit together; 
Equity and Environment prioritized  
1960 – today 
Increasing Transport Options; 
Modal Expansion 
Focuses on improving mobility options 
to reduce auto-dependence, change 
travel behavior    
1991 – today 
Transit as Urban Amenity, 
Shaping Local Development  
New transit investments facilitate 
changes in development patterns that 
make urban areas more competitive; 
transit is an urban amenity that attracts 
economic activity   
1800s – 1910 
 
1991 - today 
42 
 
Efficiency and mobility remained dominant discourses in transport planning through the 
first half of the 20th century. Roads proved incredibly efficient at increasing mobility, as induced 
demand caused more roads to spur higher rates of automobile ownership. ‘Predict and Provide’ 
planning – an analytical approach that determined future transport needs by extrapolating the 
demand for modal travel in a given urban area – embodied efficiency and mobility concerns. It 
was also disastrous for urban transit as declining ridership levels in the post war years were used 
to justify cuts to rail and bus services that offered an alternative to the private automobile. Urban 
road investments were further buttressed by the national government’s increasing tendency to 
view road investment as a national defense strategy; roads increased efficiency and mobility 
locally but also served the national purpose of war mobilization and disaster response.  
Road investment was too efficient at decentralizing the urban population. Sprawling 
development patterns and the associated negative impacts of auto-dependence prompted a 
change in discourse. During the 1960s, environmental quality and equity became important 
societal goals that found their way into transport policy (Stough and Reitveld 1997). As transit 
systems became publicly owned, equity became a justification for transit investments that served 
poorer, minority urban populations. Roads continued to be justified as a general public service 
but transit was increasingly viewed and defended as a social service for populations that did not 
have access to an automobile. Spatial equity became an increasingly dominant concern in 
transport planning as well. Urban highway investments were justified by their ability to attract 
investment back into downtown districts by reducing congestion; in reality, however, these 
investments hastened the decline of urban cores as they attracted downtown businesses and city 
residents to locate along suburban spurs. When the “Build it and they will come” notion proved 
less true for post-war transit than for roads, the costs of operating expanded systems further 
43 
 
weakened the fiscal stability of urban transit and reduced its ability to compete with the 
automobile (Taylor 2004).      
Today, transport investment goals range widely from concerns with efficiency and 
mobility to equity and protecting the environment. In recent years, economic development and 
technological leadership have become important goals of transport investment in western 
countries (Stough and Reitveld 1997). The broadening of transport objectives has expanded the 
range of actors in transport policy and operations creating institutional stress (Stough and 
Rietveld 1997), or an incompatibility between the three vortexes in the institutional triangle 
(Exhibit 4). As transport investment decisions are increasingly devolved to local governments, 
only localities that are able to minimize institutional stress by finding an alignment of rules, 
resources and reasons that help facilitate transport investment in a given context will successfully 
implement plans for enhanced transportation. But, as this chapter has shown, institutional 
strategies to facilitate investment also shape investments and can create unanticipated outcomes.      
Conclusion  
In the institutional history above, I show that different actors (both private and public) 
have taken responsibility for urban transit provision through a variety of different governance 
schemes over time. Governance approaches have followed a general centralizing to 
decentralizing arc that is orchestrated and shaped by institutional strategies – rules, resources and 
frames of reference – developed by local, state and federal stakeholders. Differences in these 
institutional strategies explain the divergent predicament of road and transit investment during 
the 20th century. 
Organizationally, urban transit owners (first land speculators, then utility companies and 
finally automobile companies) had little incentive to address the long-term financial viability of 
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transit investments as they sought to use these networks as a means to other ends, i.e. the selling 
of land, the expansion of utility services/hiding of profits and the promotion of automobile 
products. Road building, in contrast, was a public concern delegated to democratically elected 
bodies of government. Financially, roads received access to a wider range of resources – in the 
form of local, state and federal revenues raised from user and everyone pays financing strategies 
– than urban transit, which relied heavily on user pays financing. Once public funding was 
available for urban transit, the structure of intergovernmental grants drove transit systems into 
further financial disarray by prioritizing capital investments over efficient operations. The 
perspective of roads as a public responsibility and urban transit as a profit-driven private 
enterprise expected to recover the full expense of day-to-day operations from passenger revenue 
(Jones 1985), continue to influence transport policy today. Today, transport planning allows for a 
variety of discourses – including equity, environmental protection, efficiency and economic 
development – that compete with one another for legitimacy in local planning processes.  
This essay has illustrated the utility of using an institutional framework to understand the 
divergent history of roads and transit investment in American cities. Devolution supports the 
development and deployment of new approaches to transport provision, but these approaches are 
both constrained and enabled by the institutional history detailed above. Institutional design - i.e. 
“deliberately creating and changing institutions, and affecting institutions, institutional structures 
and practices” (Alexander 2005, 211) – reflects local and historical conditions, but can also be a 
strategy for overcoming existing barriers. How local stakeholders leverage the processes of 
institutional design and how existing power structures allow or hinder the inclusion of particular 









How Does Transport Value Capture Shape Project Implementation?  
Lessons from Kansas City, MO 
Value capture - a public financing strategy that levies assessments on properties and retail 
activity near public investments - is an increasingly popular approach to funding urban transit in 
American cities (Mathur and Smith 2012). Theoretically, value capture relies on the “virtuous 
cycle” of infrastructure creating access, access creating value and value being captured to fund 
infrastructure (Istrate and Levinson 2011). While the conceptual benefits of capturing place-
based value to fund infrastructure are widely accepted (Suzuki et al. 2015, Peterson 2008; see 
Smith et al. 2010 for an annotated bibliography), only a few cities, like Tokyo, Hong Kong, 
Singapore, and London’s Crossrail project rely on it as a key source of transit funding (Yoshino 
et al. 2018). In American cities value capture strategies are an emerging practice used primarily 
to fund capital expenses for specific transit projects, rather than as a system-wide source of 
funding; they rely on a variety of existing financial tools, including special assessments, tax 
increment financing and impact fees (Istrate and Levinson 2011; Zhao et al. 2012) commonly 




The growing popularity of value capture in American cities is, in part, a function of 
changes to federal policy. Since 1991, federal transportation bills (i.e. Intermodal Surface 
Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA), Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-
21), and Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century (MAP-21)) and planning programs (i.e. 
Livable Communities and Interagency Partnership for Sustainable Communities) have pushed 
for the integration of land use and transportation planning. At the same time, the amount of 
federal funding for urban transportation has been decreasing (Wachs 2004) and federal grant 
programs have placed a higher emphasis on local financing matches (Lowe 2012). Value capture 
strategies are a response to both these trends. They can provide a dedicated revenue stream for 
the Department of Transportation’s Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act 
(TIFIA) loan program (APTA 2015), and other public funding programs. Value capture financed 
projects are also well suited for the interagency Transportation Investment Generating Economic 
Recovery (TIGER) grant program which prioritizes funding for local investments that leverage 
the transport-land use dynamics at the heart of value capture financing (Medda 2012).  From a 
political perspective, the ‘virtuous cycle’ of value capture reflects a logic that using captured 
value created by public investments to pay for those investments makes them ‘self-financing’, a 
framing that helps overcome resistance to raising taxes. In sum, using value capture strategies to 
finance urban transit investments in American cities is a trend that seems likely to persist.      
To adopt value capture strategies, localities need state enabling legislation that allows 
existing tools to be used for infrastructure financing, they need to build local stakeholder support, 
and have a reliable expectation of revenue yield (Mathur and Smith 2012). State legislation 
influences value capture implementation by establishing requirements for public approval and 
shaping how funds can be used, but localities have considerable discretion to shape value capture 
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strategies to fit local conditions. Local governments can use value capture districts that have a 
wide catchment area encompassing an entire transport investment (i.e. Los Angeles’ downtown 
streetcar), or they can limit the financing district to a one or two block radius around transit 
stations (i.e. Minneapolis’ Nicollet Ave streetcar). Financing schemes can target commercial and 
retail developments and exempt residential properties to mitigate political opposition, as in the 
case of Los Angeles’ Red Line (Iacono et al. 2009), or they can forego property-based 
assessments altogether, relying on sales or employment-related taxes to raise revenue (Salon et 
al. 2017).  
In American cities, special assessment districts (SAD) and tax increment financing (TIF) 
are value capture tools that yield the highest revenues but outcomes rely on the existence of a 
strong real estate market (Mathur and Smith 2012). Financing tools, like TIF and SAD, that rely 
on the future appreciation of property values tend to transfer risk to the public sector (Zhao et al. 
2012). If value capture revenues are lower than anticipated, city governments that want to 
preserve their bond ratings will be forced to make transfers from general revenue or other public 
sources to cover debt costs for the ‘self-funded’ investment. Even when property values increase, 
localized growth may come at the expense of growth in the larger jurisdiction (Dye and 
Merrriman 2000), increasing disparities in urban spatial development patterns and furthering 
economic and racial segregation.  
How the implementation of value capture strategies impacts urban areas – including their 
influence on socio-spatial equity - is an empirical question (Fischer and Sclar 2016). Local 
conditions do not just impact the financial performance of value capture tools, they also 
influence local decisions about how and when to use value capture, as well as how to structure 
financing schemes. Local financing strategies have effects that go beyond revenue generation to 
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influence governance processes (Wachs 2004, Sciara and Wachs 2007) and justifications for 
transit investment (King and Fischer 2016), that are changing transportation planning in 
unanticipated ways. Yet, few studies have documented the practical applications of value capture 
(Smith and Gehring 2006; Mathur and Smith 2012) and even fewer consider the politics of its 
implementation or the non-monetary benefits it provides to local stakeholders.  
In this essay, I aim to help fill this gap with an examination of value capture 
implementation to pay for a new streetcar investment and operations in Kansas City, MO. In the 
section that follows, I provide some general background on the Kansas City case and describe 
the research approach. I then discuss how value capture financing impacted project 
implementation along two dimensions, public participation and operations, to illustrate how 
stakeholders in Kansas City shaped the value capture mechanism to reflect local conditions. In 
the discussion I show how these two dimensions of value capture in practice helped to 
underwrite transit investment as a property-led economic development strategy, rather than an 
accessibility-led development strategy, and explore the policy ramifications. I conclude the paper 
with a more general discussion of how value capture schemes may be impacting socio-spatial 
equity and influencing collective problem solving in unexpected ways. 
Background and Methodology    
Kansas City, Missouri is a city of almost 500,000 people located in a metropolitan region 
of two million that crosses into neighboring Kansas. The city, and its metropolitan region, is 
marked by relatively low density and auto-dependent development patterns. Although the area is 
crisscrossed with railroad tracks12, transit in the region was, until recently, exclusively provided 
by buses. There is a regional transit agency, the Kansas City Area Transit Authority, but each 
                                                          
12 Kansas City region is home to the nation’s busiest freight yards when measured by the weight of freight.  
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municipality is expected to pay for bus service within its boundaries, as there is no dedicated 
source of regional or state funding for local transit. Kansas City Area Transit Authority 
(KCATA) operates the region’s main bus system but 95% of their non-fare operating budget and 
most of their service provision resides in Kansas City, the only municipality in the region that 
has a dedicated revenue source for transit. Suburban bus services are provided separately13, by 
Johnson County, KS and Independence and Blue Springs, MO, although in 2015 the regional 
systems adopted a shared call center, common branding (RideKC) and a fare and transfer policy 
aimed at integrating the systems. Only about 3% of the region’s residents use transit for their 
daily commutes (Tomer et al. 2011).  
Kansas City’s slow to medium growth trends underwrite a political process that focuses 
on chasing, rather than shaping, development and private investment. A 2015 Brookings report 
ranked the Kansas City region 73 out of 80 for its post-recession recovery (Stafford 2015), 
raising issues about the need for improved regional collaboration on development policies 
identified a year prior in a report - titled “Prosperity at a Crossroads” - prepared by the region’s 
metropolitan planning organization, the Mid-American Council (MARC), the UMKC Center for 
Economic Information and Brookings (Eaton et al. 2014)14. Despite policies aimed at 
concentrating development, the 2008 “recession made local governments chase any type of 
development” they could get (MARC Transportation Director, May 2015). Regional 
collaboration on development policies is always a difficult endeavor but in the Kansas City 
region it is further hampered by state policies in Kansas and Missouri that offer extremely 
generous tax breaks for businesses willing to relocate to the other side of the state line. Not only 
                                                          
13 KCATA was established in 1969; In the 1980s federal policies that encouraged privatization led Johnson County, 
Blue Springs and other municipalities in the region to privatize or completely cut bus service.     
14 Notably, similar issues had been raised more than two decades earlier in a series in the local paper titled, 
“Divided We Sprawl” (the Kansas City Star). 
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do these ‘nuclear incentives’ facilitate the relocation of economic activity untethered to any 
spatial growth objectives, their existence breeds distrust among regional actors. As MARC’s 
executive director explains, “In [this] region, states are either a non-player or they are unhelpful” 
(May 2015). Thus, although local and regional plans have, for decades, promoted concentrated 
development served by enhanced transit, plan implementation has been challenged by multiple 
contextual factors.  
As the largest municipality in the region, Kansas City has been the epicenter of local 
efforts to invest in an urban and commuter rail system. In the late 1990s, a KCATA sponsored 
light rail plan met its demise after the city’s mayor – and future congressional representative - 
dismissed the project as ‘touristy-frofro’. In 2006 city voters approved a citizen-sponsored ballot 
initiative for a $975 million-dollar15 package of transit investments that included a 27-mile light 
rail linking midtown to the airport, a system of 60 electric shuttles connecting neighborhoods to 
the light rail line as well as a gondola system serving several sites (i.e. Liberty Memorial, Penn 
Valley Park and Union Station) in the city’s near downtown neighborhoods. Financed by a 
citywide 3/8-cents sales tax that would only raise a portion of the total expense ($575 million 
dollars), city council cancelled the project shortly after voter approval on the basis that it did not 
meet state requirements that public investments be fully covered by a dedicated revenue stream. 
Two years later, the city put forth a fiscally constrained transport plan that was rejected by more 
than 60% of voters. Reflecting on the state of urban transit in Kansas City, the city manager 
lamented that they “had struggled with rail for probably about 25 years…we were not getting 
                                                          
15 Actual costs of the package were widely disputed. The estimated price of $975 million assumed a cost of $35 
million/mile rather than the average of $54 million/mile or higher, and did not include funding for bridges or 
intersection overpasses that could drastically increase the cost of the project.   
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anywhere on a citywide basis trying to come up with a comprehensive rail system”(City 
Manager, May 2015).        
Ten years after the failed city-sponsored light rail plan, Kansas City is in its third year of 
streetcar service and in the planning stages for two extensions to their 2.2 mile “starter system”. 
How was the city able to turn around their dismal history of urban transit investment? How did 
local stakeholders overcome barriers that had seemed insurmountable in previous efforts and 
how are these new strategies influencing transport investment and planning in the region? I use a 
qualitative investigation to explore these questions, relying on 23 semi-structured face-to-face 
interviews conducted with stakeholders from city government, regional planning agencies, 
economic development agencies, and advocacy groups during the 18 months prior to the opening 
of the value capture-funded streetcar investment in May 2016 and selected follow up interviews 
conducted in March 2018. Interview subjects were identified from a review of planning 
documents, city websites, and organizational flow charts as well as through snowball sampling. I 
transcribed and coded all interview data, which I complement with content analysis of planning 
documents, participant observation and geospatial tax lot and land use data obtained from Kansas 
City’s online database, Open Data KC, as well as database of streetcar-adjacent development 
projects compiled by the city.  
Findings 
Although value capture financing was instrumental for securing revenue for a modern 
streetcar project in Kansas City, its benefit to local stakeholders goes beyond financing. More 
specifically, city officials leveraged value capture as a tool to shape the ‘publics’ involved with 
transport planning, and to redefine the metrics of a successful transport investment. These 
unanticipated impacts of value capture financing, profiled below, illustrate how local context 
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shapes transport financing strategies and suggests that localities may be using financing tools to 
support a strategy of property-led economic development, a topic I explore in the discussion.   
Value Capture and Public Participation     
Public engagement in transport planning is shaped by state laws that govern local 
decision-making processes. In Missouri, a1980 voter-approved amendment to the state 
constitution known as the Hancock Amendment16 limits state spending and requires voter 
approval of local taxes to fund public investments (Schweich 2014). As a result, local decisions 
about transport investment, and other public spending on physical investments, are primarily 
determined at the ballot box. Ballot box planning complicates the collective decision-making 
process as voter support for local transportation taxes is a poor proxy for local transit support 
(Manville and Cummins 2015) but, as one city council member explained, “Whether that makes 
sense from a transit point of view, from a governance point of view, from a how to design our 
city point of view, that’s just the law of the land in Missouri.” (City Council Member, May 2015)  
After the 2008 city-sponsored light rail ballot failed, city leaders examined election 
returns to better understand the geography of support for enhanced public transit. Unsurprisingly, 
the 2008 initiative - and many proposals that came before— was supported by more than 50% of 
residents in a handful of neighborhoods close to downtown (i.e. River Market and Crossroads) 
but failed to gain majority support in more populated but lower density “inner suburban” 
neighborhoods located north of the Missouri River and south of the Country Club Plaza (Figure 
9). City leaders concluded that “only way to get support for a system the city could afford was to 
change the voter pool, stop asking for citywide approval for a system that won't serve the entire 
city.” (Chair, City Council Transportation Committee, May 2015)    
                                                          
16 Article X, Section 16 through 24 
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Exhibit 9: Kansas City and Streetcar District, Land Value by Tax Parcel (2014)  
  
Kansas City, Missouri Streetcar District and Downtown 
Neighborhoods 
Previous transit proposals had been city-wide or regional initiatives, allowing all legally 
registered voters to cast a ballot. After examining the election returns, city officials adopted a 
new strategy to bring rail transit to the city. By restricting the area where revenue for the 
investment would be raised, value capture provided an opportunity for city leaders to limit the 
size, and scope of the population approving the transit investment. Indeed, shrinking the voting 
pool to a transit friendly population of “dedicated urbanists” was a primary driver behind local 
decisions to use a value capture strategy. According to the president of the regional transit 
advocacy organization, whose viewpoint was similar to other local actors, value capture:  
…was the only option available because to get momentum for transit in Kansas City we 
needed to shrink the pool of people that were involved with the conversation. Localizing 
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the vote to engage the people who were most invested in the corridor allowed us to get 
something moving forward. (President, Regional Transit Organization, May 2015)    
Transportation value capture in Missouri relies on Transportation Development Districts 
(TDDs), state-enabled political subdivisions authorized to levy special assessments on properties 
in proximity to a public investment. The TDD approval process, established by state law, 
employs a different, and more arduous, voting protocol than general elections. Residents living 
in the TDD had to register for the special election in-person at City Hall and after receiving their 
ballots in the mail had to get them notarized before returning them to the city. There was no on-
site voting or other issues on the special ballot and residents had a two-month window to 
complete their ballots which were due on December 12, 2012. Only 6,449 Kansas City residents 
were eligible to vote in the election because they lived in the value capture district but only 10% 
(697) of eligible voters requested ballots and only 8.5% (650) submitted a ballot. As a result, 350 
people that voted in favor of the project committed the city to a $120 million-dollar capital 
investment as well as responsibility for operating and maintaining the system for the foreseeable 
future.  
Kansas City’s strategy to shrink the voter pool using value capture tools was only 
possible because of a strong imbalance between residential and commercial uses, and a 
concentration of property wealth in the streetcar district. According to those involved, TDD 
boundaries reflected both economic and political concerns, “based on where we could maximize 
revenue and where we could get a property tax assessment and a sales tax levy to pay the 
operating costs and the debt service.” (City Manager, May 2015) The TDD covers the most 
economically dense (Exhibit 9) and one of the least residentially dense parts of the city. Tax lot 
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data17 from 2014 - two years prior to the streetcar opening - shows that while the TDD only 
included 2.6% of the city’s tax lots it contained 12% of the city’s total assessed tax lot value. 
Although there is considerable variation, the average value of a tax lot in the streetcar district is 
$149,203 compared to an average value of $30,189 for city tax lots not located in the district. 
The comparatively high property values found in the TDD are largely a factor of its land use 
patterns, which are dominated by commercial and industrial properties. 
There was little political opposition to value capture financing prior to the 2012 vote, 
partially because the localized voting process wasn’t covered by local media to the same extent 
as previous city-wide referenda and partially because downtown businesses fully expected the 
initiative to fail. After the proposal passed, business leaders and downtown property owners 
lobbied to kill the project, mobilizing a legal challenge to the value capture district and appealing 
to local media about the unfairness of the planning process. The city responded to these 
grievances of “taxation without representation” (Streetcar Authority Board Member, May 2015), 
by creating a non-profit organization – the KC Streetcar Authority (KCSA) – to be responsible 
for the value capture funded investment. The Streetcar Authority “gives the business community 
a seat at the table for how their money would be spent, protecting their investment by having 
control” (Authority CEO, May 2015) but, as the Mayor explained, it was also “important to get it 
out of city hall to make folks who are always negative about government more comfortable” 
(May 2015).  
Governed by a 13-member city-appointed board, the Authority relies heavily on 
volunteer labor from the district. Since its creation in 2014, it has been instrumental in engaging 
                                                          
17 Cadastre Tax Lot data obtained from Open Data KCMO (https://data.kcmo.org/GIS/Cadastre/2ff3-4gur). Total 
value is a sum of land and improvement values. Although tax assessments are levied annually, assessment updates 
are conducted infrequently. This data used here was last updated in 2014 and, as a result, does not contain 
information on developments that entered the tax rolls after 2014.    
56 
 
a range of downtown interests – i.e. residents, business owners and corporate representatives - in 
making decisions about streetcar system design, operations and financial management that are 
typically delegated to government employees. The Streetcar Authority does not have 
representation from traditional urban transit stakeholders, like transit dependent populations, 
environmental groups, and housing or social service organizations, although major changes in 
policy and spending have to be co-approved by city council. The tenure of the 9 private board 
members is twice the length of the four public members, ensuring that private concerns dominate 
policy decisions on daily operations and future investment.  
While the streetcar’s public approval process reflects a strategy to reduce the number of 
people involved, the city’s approach to management and operations increases the types of 
interests directly involved. Unlike other streetcar investments that have been driven by business 
and property interests (Brown et al. 2015; Lowe and Grengs 2017), “businesses [in Kansas City] 
don’t see transit as an area that affects them, they don't see how or why they should get involved 
with transport issues.” (Economic Development Agency Planner, May 2015) A local transit 
advocate elaborated that the local business community “is dominated by people who only think 
of the capital expense [and] feel that rail transit is too much of a capital expenditure for them to 
support it.” (Transit Advocate, May 2015) The president of the regional transit advocacy group 
concurred and went even further explaining that “the business community hurts our 
transportation opportunities - they continue to locate in the suburbs, along the highways because 
the executives believe that all their workers are just like them, seeking big suburban houses and 
services accessed through automobiles.” Ironically, the business communities’ own opposition to 
the value capture assessment spurred their deeper engagement with the investment it funded.  
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Although comprehensive transport planning demands the consideration of a wide range 
of concerns and population needs (Deakin 2001), citizen participation is a fundamentally 
contested concept (Day 1997) that, in practice, often reflects the perspectives of middle-class 
constituencies (Wachs 2004). In Kansas City, stakeholders developed a participation strategy 
structured around a geography of support, a tactic that was only possible with value capture. As 
one of the neighborhood activists explained, the “best plan for success is to build transit in areas 
where it has proven support, not into areas where the perception of need for transit may be 
highest.” (May 2015) The Kansas City case illustrates how, “in the contemporary context of 
growing complexity and rapid change, civic leaders, interest groups, citizens and even 
government itself are pulling together stakeholders to address difficult problems (Innes and 
Booher 2004, 422). It shows how these new venues for dialogue reflect the strategic – rather than 
widespread – inclusion of interests and stakeholders that helps to reduce conflict in transport 
planning. Indeed, the streetcar’s project manager echoed the view of multiple respondents when 
he explained, “this project had the most robust community outreach associated with any capital 
improvement and planning projects that I've been a part of and the most willing to re-evaluate 
things based on community input.” (May 2015) He is correct that the streetcar project employs a 
collaborative approach to planning, but he fails to recognize the exclusionary aspects of 
confining participation in transport planning to a small geography and focused on a restricted set 
of goals.  
In sum, the capture strategy employed in Kansas City is twofold: (1) value is captured 
using property and retail activity assessments and (2) participation is captured, as public-sector 
actors selectively choose which residents and concerns are engaged in the streetcar planning 
process. The two capture strategies are related: value capture strategies were used to shape and 
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capture participation. Streetcar planning in Kansas City was marked by low levels of discord and 
high levels of agreement largely due to who was engaged in the process. As an example of 
project-based, rather than comprehensive, transit planning the streetcar reflects a transactional 
approach whereby select stakeholders are brought together to solve a short-term, narrowly-
construed problem rather than engaging on a broader, regional and comprehensive level. Kansas 
City’s approach to failed ballot measures contrasts with other regions, like Seattle, who reworked 
the combination of projects and funding sources in various Sound Transit ballot initiatives until 
they found a mix that voters approved18. Kansas City, in contrast, was willing to jettison the 
regional, or citywide approach and embrace a transactional strategy focused on getting ‘rails in 
the ground’, a tactic enabled by value capture. The Kansas City case illustrates how participation 
is shaped by financing strategies, and suggests that value capture may be a tool used to restrict 
planning and investment management to a small group of geographically homogenous interests 
whose decisions are tangentially related to regional, or even citywide, planning and policy 
efforts.             
Value Capture and Transport Operations 
Value capture is primarily a capital revenue strategy, based on the rationale that new 
investments – rather than enhanced service – create the greatest changes in land value (Salon et 
al. 2017). A recent analysis of transit value capture in American cities includes only a single case 
where the tool is used to fund operations as well as capital expenses (APTA 2015). Fare box 
revenue is an important source of operational funds for many transit systems but fares are also 
lauded for their ability to encourage efficient use of the system (Adams et al. 2001, Vickrey 
                                                          
18 In 2007 voters in the Seattle region rejected a ballot proposition for $47 billion in regional transportation 
projects, including a 50-mile light rail line and highway improvements. The following year, voters approved 17.9 
million for a scaled-back 34 mile light rail investment.   
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1963). Although decisions about user fees are often divorced from financing decisions in practice 
(Taylor and Norton 2009) most urban transit systems in US cities still charge a fare.    
The Kansas City streetcar is one a few urban transport systems that is free for riders 
(Prince and Dellheim 2018). Financing operations from non-fare sources was a key concern of 
stakeholders; as the Chair of city council transportation committee explained, “[T]ransit 
problems are not capital problems, they are operational problems. If you don’t have the 
operational component figured out, there is no sense in moving forward.” (May 2015) Missouri 
restricts value capture revenue to capital investments, reflecting the common use of TDDs for 
financing road investments, like highway interchanges to new retail developments. Using TDD 
revenues for streetcar operations required changes to the state law, an effort that the city initiated 
in spring 2011. After leveraging political favors and negotiating with state lawmakers, the city 
successfully got an amendment that allowed revenues to be used for operational expenses, but 
the state restricted the exception to Jackson County, prohibiting revenues for operational 
expenses in the other three counties the city covers and in other municipalities in the region. 
Annual operating expenses – around 4 million - are only partially covered by the .01 cent sales 
tax in the value capture district. The remaining costs are covered by an annual city revenue 
transfer of 2.1 million, half from a reallocation of undesignated transportation funds and half 
from monies that were previously dedicated to funding KCATA bus operations.     
From the perspective of local actors in Kansas City, charging people to use the streetcar 
was a failing proposition for several reasons. Fare collection would raise just about enough 
revenue to cover fare infrastructure, maintenance and enforcement. Local stakeholders also 
believed that making the streetcar free would make it more attractive to downtown workers and 
visitors. Experiences of other streetcar systems suggest that fares may dampen ridership. 
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Recently opened streetcar systems in Atlanta and Detroit provided fare-free service for an initial 
period (one year in Atlanta and three months in Detroit) in an attempt to attract riders and both 
systems experienced substantial ridership declines of 58% and 40%, respectively, after they 
imposed fares (Wickert 2017, Lawrence 2017)19. In areas with low transit modal share, like 
Kansas City, Atlanta and Detroit, where existing incentives and investments create path 
dependence in favor of automobile-dependent travel and development, fare-free transit is a way 
to facilitate modal shifts to new common carrier urban transit services, like modern streetcars.  
The most important aspect of not charging a fare was that it allowed local actors to 
redefine the project’s measures of success. As one of the Authority board members explained:  
[T]he usually determination of transit projects is will it get subsidy, subsidy, subsidy? 
Well the entire [streetcar] is subsidized so if there is no user fee at all so what is success? 
It’s great to have the money thing off the table and make people really think about what 
transit can do. (Streetcar Authority Board Member, May 2015)  
Not charging a fare allowed the city to orient project evaluation around land use and 
economic development, rather than ridership, metrics. As the project manager explained, “if the 
cars are sparsely filled all the time but all of a sudden, we fill in those [development] gaps 
between the Crossroads and downtown and they are happy and vibrant, to me that is success.” 
(May 2015) Emphasizing the non-mobility benefits of transit allowed actors to mobilize interests 
in a new way. As the president of the regional transit advocacy group explained:  
You don't get any community excited about transit if you are talking about moving people 
around but if you start ratcheting up the conversation about how do we save the core of 
our city, how do we focus our development patterns, how do we bring money to our 
                                                          
19 Atlanta’s streetcar may again be fare-free when MARTA, the regional transit agency, takes control of the system 
in July 2018. 
61 
 
region. That’s the way to engage an average person who does not see themselves as a 
direct transit user. Framing as less of a transportation issue and more of an urban 
development and lifestyle issue is the best way to engage the community. (President, 
Regional Transit Advocacy Group, May 2015) 
Transport financing policy, including whether to charge a fare for system users, results 
from political compromises that seek to balance efficiency, effectiveness and equity concerns 
(Taylor 2004; Taylor and Norton 2009). Actors in Kanas City weighed these factors and 
determined that effectively connecting land use and transit was more important that using a fare 
to achieve transportation efficiency. This perspective is not out of line with trends in 
transportation policy: the land use-transportation connection is a key concern of contemporary 
transport planning (Cervero et al. 2004). Not charging a fare allowed local actors to focus on the 
streetcar’s economic development impacts, a much more salient area of concern for local elected 
officials and property owners (Petersen 1991) than the social, environmental or mobility benefits 
typically emphasized in transport investments.  
Using value capture strategies to pay for transit operations is a novel approach to solving 
the operations funding problem. By using retail activity taxes – rather than fare box revenue - to 
fund streetcar operations, stakeholders were able to effective tie the performance of Kansas 
City’s streetcar investment to the economic development goals underlying the projects’ rationale, 
and to focus public attention on the urban revitalization rather than the ridership outcomes. Yet, 
when we evaluate transport projects on their ability to change development patterns via 
mechanisms not related to mobility or accessibility, is it still appropriate to view them as 
transportation projects? How might this matter for our understanding of value capture practice in 




Value capture financing is lauded for its efficient economic theory, simple 
administration, financial justice and its ability to concentrate development (Batt 2001). Value 
capture strategies do not just raise revenue for investment, they also shape development patterns 
by providing a financial incentive – i.e. raising the value of land - to redevelop particular parcels 
and uses. Theoretically, higher costs of land reflect an accessibility premium; new transit 
investments increase accessibility to a particular location, and this access creates new value that 
is captured to fund the investment (Istrate and Levinson 2011). Accessibility - a planning metric 
promoted by academic and advocates - includes the ease of moving on the network (i.e. 
mobility) as well as the location of activities (Sclar et al. 2014). Although there are numerous 
ways to measure accessibility, it is often quantified as the number of jobs and other daily 
activities that can be reached from a location within a set amount of time. While increased 
accessibility directly benefits the population at large, its monetary benefits are capitalized in land 
values, and as such, can be “captured” by financing tools to fund public investments. This is one 
of the major benefits of using value capture financing for urban transit (Batt 2001, Istrate and 
Levinson 2011).    
In Kansas City, however, value capture financing is not concerned with increasing 
accessibility, or even drastically improving mobility. As illustrated above, value capture 
provided substantial political benefits that outweighed transport-related outcomes. More 
tangibly, the streetcar system provides minimal, if any, improvements to accessibility. Operating 
in mixed traffic at 10 to 15-minute headways, the streetcar is not a rapid transit system that 
reduces travel times for downtown residents or workers. Since it operates on the same corridor 
previously served by the MAX express bus line, the investment doesn’t make new locations 
63 
 
accessible via transit either, it only changes the transit mode (i.e. rail) available to downtown 
residents and visitors. Ridership metrics reflect this: a fall 2017 survey found that only 38% of 
streetcar riders used the system to access employment, and that ridership rates were highest on 
the weekends and during special events (ETC Institute 2018).  
Rather than increasing property values by enhancing accessibility for residents and 
workers, the city’s value capture funded streetcar increases property values by signaling to the 
private sector and land developers that city leadership is invested in this part of the city. As the 
Director of the Economic Development Council explained, “a streetcar has designated tracks that 
can't be moved, so it helps a lot with development and signals where the city plans to put its 
investments.” (May 2015) The President of the Regional Transit Advocacy group elaborated:  
[R]ail sends a signal of where the city plans to invest their money in the future – ‘okay 
the city is investing in this corridor, is identifying this corridor as a major corridor in the 
city and I want to be part of that’...[the city] wouldn't invest rail in a corridor that people 
weren’t going to use. The city not going to move the streetcar five years down the road 
when things start happening in other parts of the city - its an investment that developers 
see as long-term and so they are willing to build. (May 2015) 
How value capture works in theory – leveraging the value created by changes in 
accessibility – is different than how it works in the Kansas City case (Exhibit 10). While value 
capture has been lauded for its ability to monetize accessibility (Levinson and Istrate 2011, 
Medda 2012) in the case of Kansas City it underwrites a property-led, rather than accessibility-
led, economic development strategy. Accessibility is a regional concern that requires 
intergovernmental coordination and collaborative investment to expand transit investments as 
well as public-private cooperation to facilitate land use changes near investments. Property-led 
64 
 
economic development - a “public sector strategy to encourage economic growth within a 
central-city jurisdiction by creating the conditions under which real estate investors are drawn to 
and can extract value from a place” (Wolf-Powers 2005, 186) – also requires public-private 
cooperation but one that is facilitated through property markets more than strategic planning.  
Exhibit 10: Value Capture Process 
In Theory In Practice 
 
 
Although lauded for its visible results (Healey 1990), its incremental, and entrepreneurial 
nature (Fainstein 1991, Turok 1992) and its use of existing planning tools like zoning and 
property tax incentives (Wolf-Powers 2005), property-led economic development is primarily 
concerned with spurring any type of development that raises a municipality’s tax base than with 
changing transport patterns. Property development was a primary motivation behind Kansas 
City’s streetcar investment, accounting for 79% of the project’s anticipated benefits (King and 
Fischer 2016) and local policies in the streetcar’s vicinity are indicative of a property-led 
economic development strategy. The city concentrates development incentives, like TIF and tax 
abatement programs, in the downtown core and, since 2010, has permissive zoning and building 
codes aimed at increasing mixed use, high density development and reducing unproductive uses, 
like surface parking. Prior to the streetcar, however, changes to the city’s land development 
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policies did not spur the downtown transformation city leaders desired. As of 2014, almost 40% 
(2,157 of the 5,507) of tax parcels in the TDD were vacant or used for surface parking lots, three 
times higher than the citywide rate of 13.5% (27,717 of 205,076 Parcels). In this context, value 
capture financing allowed local officials to put financial pressure on the owners of surface 
parking lots, levying a special assessment of $54.73/parking space. As of 2015, the approach had 
been successful, as a city council member explains, “we are consuming surface parking lots, 
turning them into buildings, at an unprecedented rate.” (City Council Member, May 2015)  
As a property-led economic development strategy, Kansas City’s streetcar investment 
appears to be fairly successful. Between 2014 and January 2018, a total of 132 construction 
projects worth over 2.2 billion dollars have been completed or permitted within the value capture 
district20. The streetcar investment plays an important role, not by enhancing accessibility but as 
a signaling tool. As the public sector continues to make less direct investments in the built 
environment, publicly funded investments like a modern streetcar will carry extraordinary weight 
in signaling a city’s spatial development priorities. The Kansas City case also suggests that value 
capture strategies may be a means for reducing the interests involved with transport investment 
decisions and re-focusing evaluations from a primary impact on accessibility to a secondary, and 
more nebulous, impact on property development. In light of these findings, academics and 
advocates need to reconsider their blanket support for transport value capture. Although it has 
the theoretical potential to connect transport investment with larger social goals of accessibility 
and social integration, how value capture is implemented and leveraged by local actors matters 
considerably.  
                                                          
20 Based on the city-maintained database of development projects in the streetcar district 
66 
 
Value capture financing strategies are being used (or are proposed) to fund modern 
streetcar investments in numerous cities, including Atlanta, Cincinnati, Minneapolis, Milwaukee 
Los Angeles, Sacramento, and Ft. Lauderdale; although these investments may be useful for 
signaling private sector actors, they may also be undermining transport goals related to access 
and mobility as well as inclusion. Yet the importance of signaling also suggests a potential 
opening for more affordable, and accessibility-oriented, transport modes like Bus Rapid Transit. 
Indeed, the findings from Kansas City suggest that advocates and academic need to do a better 
job illustrating the economic development impacts and public signaling benefits of bus rapid 
transit investments to facilitate broader use of this more affordable urban transport mode.             
Conclusion 
In Kansas City, value capture is being used in unexpected ways that have larger 
consequences for transport planning. As a means for reducing the number of people involved 
with project approval and redefining project success in terms of property development, value 
capture financing in Kansas City has impacts that go beyond its revenue raising capabilities. 
Reflecting a property-led economic strategy, rather than a transport accessibility development 
strategy, the Kansas City streetcar has spurred private sector development by providing a clear 
signal of the city’s spatial development priorities and funneling development and redevelopment 
to areas of the city with financial and regulatory policies that facilitate higher density 
development.  
The area of Kansas City that is a priority for development, according to this logic, is the 
downtown core and its adjacent neighborhoods. Given existing spatial patterns of race and 
income in American cities, value capture financed investments also signal who is a development 
priority for the city. In Kansas City, and perhaps in other urban areas, value capture financing is 
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a strategy to shape who benefits from public transit, by allowing cities to define the populations 
that deserve public transit based on the populations that can raise money from their community 
to pay for public transit. When financing schemes spur the creation of new governance and 
planning processes that depart from the ‘traditional legal and political norm of uniformity of 
municipal action within city” (Briffault 1997, 523) they can facilitate the “secession of the 
successful” where more affluent members and areas withdraw from city-wide public services – 
like bus transit – to fund their own needs (Reich 1991).  This is less likely to occur when value 
capture is used to fund investments that are integrated with a robust regional transit networks – 
like in Seattle – as all system users benefit from value-capture enhancements. When used for 
starter investments (as in Kansas City, Detroit, Cincinnati and Milwaukee, to name a few), value 
capture financing may actually set transport planning on a troubling trajectory.         
Value capture is a potential solution to local needs for new revenue streams to fund urban 
transit investments. Efforts to encourage the use of value capture financing for urban transport, 
however, need to be aware of how these financing strategies interact with local conditions and 
the decisions of local actors to shape transport planning and investment in new ways. Although 
value capture allowed local officials to secure funding for a starter rail line – and is proposed to 
fund two extensions – it has also shaped transport planning in favor of business-related and 
property development concerns. Changes to federal policy that encourage the use of value 
capture, for instance by giving greater weight to projects that use it to raise local matching funds 
may actually lead transport planning away from its normative concerns with engaging a broad 
range of stakeholders and interests and making stronger connections between transport 









Urbanity, Community and Equity: 
Assessing the Social Sustainability of Streetcar-Led Revitalization in Kansas City, MO 
 
Contemporary urban planning practice is guided, at least rhetorically, by the framework 
of sustainable development. Promoted by advocates and academic since the early 1990s, 
sustainability challenges the conventional wisdoms of urban development by seeking to balance 
economic benefits with environmental and social impacts (Yiftachel and Hedgcock 1993). 
Initially spurred by environmental concerns, sustainability aims to achieve “development that 
meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet 
their own needs” (WCED 1987, 40).  
From a transportation perspective, sustainable development is evident in higher density, 
and mixed-use projects that support mass and non-motorized forms of transport (Curtis et al. 
2009). Sustainable transport policy attempts to move urban areas away from a reliance on the 
private automobile and toward more concentrated development patterns that foster long term 
environmental, economic and social sustainability. Although the primary tenant of contemporary 
transport planning is the transformation of urban form, transportation planners have primarily 
approached it from a mobility standpoint (Grengs 2005, Cervero and Dai 2014), ignoring the 
69 
 
larger societal impacts and often failing to consider how policies impact different social and 
economic groups (Lane 2017). 
Social sustainability, which includes justice and equity, has been embraced differently by 
the various sub-competencies of planning. In urban transportation, federal and local actors have 
viewed transit investment as an acceptable counterbalance to the social damages imposed by a 
transportation system skewed toward the automobile (Fitch 1964, Smerk 1991, Weiner 1999). 
Following the urban riots of the 1960s, transportation officials were criticized for their lack of 
attention to urban problems (Kain and Meyer 1970). The McCone Commission (1965) was 
explicit about the lack of transportation as a contributing factor in the Watts riots while the 
Kerner Commission report placed less emphasis on transportation itself but identified issues 
intimately tied to transportation, like spatial mismatch, racial segregation, and concentrated 
poverty (Kerner et al. 1968).  
In the 1960s there was broad ideological appeal of publicly funded mass transit for a 
variety of purposes, including “assisting the elderly and handicapped and poor” (Altshuler et al. 
1979) and public officials regularly citied economic and social benefits in their support for transit 
(Jones 1985, Taylor and Samples 2002). In the decade that followed, Congress expanded funding 
for mass transit investments (1966, 14 demonstration projects totaling $7 million), created a 
stand-alone agency for urban transit (1968), and provided operating funds for local service 
(1973, 1974). Government efforts to strengthen transit were backed by a growing recognition 
that the changing geographic patterns of US cities were straining the social fabric, and putting 
some people at a serious disadvantage in reaching jobs, commerce, schools and recreation 
(Vuchic 1999) and creating uneven patterns of development (Hart 1993).      
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Yet until the late 20th century, explicit legislation to protect or aid the poor, minorities 
and other transportation-disadvantaged was rare (Deka 2004). Starting with the passage of the 
federal Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, federal programs and policies, including the 
Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991, the Transportation Equity Act of 
1998 and a 1994 executive order titled, “Federal Action to Address Environmental Justice in 
Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations”, have promoted a consideration of the social 
impacts of transportation investments and policies. In 2005, Congress passed SAFETEA-LU, the 
Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users, that 
provided funding for the New Freedom formula grant program to support new public 
transportation services and public transportation alternatives program for individuals with 
disabilities.  
While federal initiatives “have the potential to encourage the incorporation of social 
justice into operational urban transportation planning process” (Deka 2004, 335) the extent to 
which social concerns influence local planning processes and outcomes is an empirical question. 
Like all collective efforts, policy outcomes are the result of political compromise among 
competing values, groups and geographies who represent a mix of self-and public-interests. 
Examining how equity is framed, adjudicated and used in a particular context allows for the 
deconstruction of bias and power structures (De Neufville and Barton 1987; Healey 1992), with 
implications for rethinking the practices of participatory and deliberative democracy and the 
potential of planning in fostering their progress (Gualini 2001).  
In this essay, I use qualitative methods to examine the social sustainability of a modern 
streetcar project in Kansas City, MO. I begin with a review of the academic literature on urban 
transportation and social sustainability, examining how transport policy impacted the urbanity, 
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community and equity of U.S. urban areas during the 20th century. I then describe the project’s 
methodology and data sources and introduce the Kansas City case. In the third section, I use the 
concept of social sustainability to evaluate the streetcar project’s outcomes along several 
dimensions. In the conclusion, I discuss the relevance of these findings to planning and policy 
practice and also make connections to larger trends in global urbanism. The question is not 
whether transportation planning should be responsible for fixing social problems of the 
contemporary city but rather what are the elements of transportation planning practice that have 
exacerbated transportation inequities and impeded planning’s capacity to overcome them? 
(Grengs 2013).  
Transport and Social Sustainability  
Sustainability aims to achieve a long-term balance between the environmental, economic 
and social impacts of public policies and investments. In urban transportation, environmental 
sustainability is evident in policies aimed at reducing automobile pollution and reliance on the 
private automobile (Banister 2002). From an economic perspective, transport investments 
support sustainability by enhancing productivity and attracting new firms and residents to 
particular locations (Banister and Berechman 2001). The social sustainability of transport 
investments receives plenty of rhetorical support but has less explicit policy support than the 
other two pillars. Indeed, the rhetoric and practice of sustainability has failed to eliminate 
poverty, inadequate housing and other long-term social problems (Reclift 2005, Boone and 
Modarres 2006) while transport policy’s concerns with diverting people from cars has pushed 
urban transport even further away from social concerns (Grengs 2005).  
Social sustainability is “the continuing ability of a city to function as a long-term viable 
setting for human interaction, communication and cultural development” (Yiftachel and 
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Hedgcock 1993, 140). Socially sustainable cities are marked by vitality and a common sense of 
place among residents as well as a lack of conspicuous spatial segregation and overt intergroup 
conflict. The concept is useful for, at least, two reasons: (1) it encourages us to think about the 
long-term impacts of planning processes and policies on the city’s social fabric and (2) it allows 
for a consideration of three dimensions - urbanity, community and equity - that capture a range 
of ways that public interventions impact social development. Below, I review the relationship 
between transportation and these three dimensions of social sustainability, using historical 
examples to show how 20th century transport planning and policy impacted social sustainability.        
Urbanity 
Urbanity is concerned with nurturing the physical and social density and diversity that 
has historically defined cities. During the 19th century, urban reformers promoted 
decentralization as a key solution to the untenable density and congestion of the industrial city 
(Boyer 1983). Transportation investments – first rail-based mass transit networks and then roads 
– facilitated the relocation of people and economic activity away from congested industrial 
districts, laying the groundwork for a new urban form (Warner 1962). Rail investments 
supported moderately dense, mixed use development patterns but road investments pushed 
decentralization to an extreme, facilitating suburban development patterns that obliterated the 
density and diversity of uses (and people) that had traditionally defined cities (Troy 1996). As 
cities struggled to compete with their growing suburban counterparts for residents and jobs, they 
eschewed mass and non-motorized urban transport in favor of private automobiles. Replacing 
formerly productive land uses and active spaces with surface parking lots and wider streets 
negatively impacted people’s experience of central, urban areas (Norton 2008), furthering 
decline and disinvestment in the central city (Vigar 2002).   
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Initially, planners responded to the declining city using the same anti-urban perspective 
they had used to build suburbia. Underwritten by the traditional planning dichotomies that 
demonized the town and valorized the country, the dominant solutions available to planners were 
based in notions of order, hierarchy, amenity, uniformity, space and privacy (Yiftachel and 
Hedgcock 1993). Although challenged throughout the 20th century, most famously by Jane 
Jacobs (1961), urban officials aimed to compete with suburbia by copying their development 
formulas. In the 1960s many cities expanded their borders to facilitate suburban style housing 
that would allow them to better compete for residents and investment (Perry 1994). Urban 
highway investments that obliterated existing urban neighborhoods were justified on their ability 
to bring more activity to downtown areas by improving connections with bedroom suburbs. In 
practice however, urban highway investments had the counter effecs of attracting businesses and 
residences away from existing urban areas, furthering the spiral of urban disinvestment (Vigar 
2002). Within urban neighborhoods, Urban Renewal projects created super block developments 
with cloistered public spaces that mimicked suburban values of privacy, uniformity and space, 
and ignored the importance of the human-scale experience (Jacobs 1961).        
Urbanity is a reaction to the outcomes of 20th century transport and land use policies 
(Leinberger 2012). It is most evident in contemporary ‘back to the city’ movements that aim to 
redevelop urban neighborhoods not by displacing the city’s disarray and disorder with uniformity 
and privacy but by fostering physical spaces that attract and retain a diversity of land uses, 
buildings and activities. Planning interventions that facilitate the redevelopment of existing 
structures help to reinforce a diversity in the built environment, while urban designs that are 
more human-scale and allow for informal social interactions – including sidewalks, parks, coffee 
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shops, community-oriented events - that are diverse, authentic and “urban” rather than ordered, 
fabricated and suburban, also support urbanity.  
  Transportation was a primary driver in decentralizing development away from urbanity 
but today transport is being used to foster greater urbanity, by re-concentrating residents and 
activity to revitalize neighborhoods. The modern streetcar movement is a key example of transit 
projects that are primarily used to spur land development (King and Fischer 2016) and, in some 
cases, reverse longstanding trends of disinvestment and decline in urban neighborhoods. By 
providing an enabling legislative and economic environment that shapes housing and retail 
activities in the proximity of transit investments, planners can help support “Back to the City” 
movements that do not just replicate suburban development trends of order, hierarchy, privacy 
and uniformity.     
Community 
Community, the second dimension of social sustainability, refers to feelings of trust and 
companionship among residents and between residents and policymakers. Transportation 
systems impact social relationships (Yago 1983) by shaping how people interact with one 
another as they navigate through space (Schivelbusch 1979) and connecting mobility-impaired 
and non-drivers with public programs and community services (Vuchic 1999). Indeed, 
transportation “coordinates the social and physical orientations of society” and without it 
members of society “could not be socially related while being physically distant” (Klausner 
1980, 114).  
Transportation decision-making processes also impacts feelings of trust between 
residents and policymakers, historically fostering adversarial relationships between policymakers 
and the communities they serve (Grengs 2002). Implementation of the Federal Interstate 
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Program during the 1950s and 1960s decimated many urban neighborhoods, bisecting existing 
communities through the use of eminent domain and creating an adversarial relationship between 
transportation officials and local residents (Weiner 1999). Urban highway investments combined 
with Urban Renewal projects to create the “highway revolts” of the late 1960s and 1970s. Anti-
highway organizing started in the late 1950s in San Francisco, where residents organized against 
plans for the Embarcadero Freeway. They successfully convinced the city to abandon the 
unfinished project and laid the political groundwork for the constructed portions’ removal after it 
was damaged in the 1989 earthquake. Citizen pressure also successfully halted the Jones Falls 
Expressway in Baltimore, a crosstown expressway in Philadelphia and a highway through New 
Orleans’s Vieux-Carre neighborhood, among others (Gillham 2002). Opposition to the Mount 
Hood Freeway in Oregon touched off a regional planning revolution in Portland, culminating 
with the establishment of the first and only directly elected regional government in the United 
States (ibid). Highway revolts were a product of distrust and a perceived lack of respect among a 
wide range of residents that prompted a change to transport decision-making processes to give 
voice to a greater range of concerns, and to rebuild trust in policymakers.    
Despite policy changes to foster a more inclusive and collaborative planning process, 
transport planning processes can still foster discord and erode community rather than building 
trust and feelings of companionship. Planning processes that rely heavily on the ballot box and 
voter initiatives to determine transport investment and policies can stoke conflict, as planning 
becomes more about winning than about collaborative negotiation. Indeed, this may even be a 
tactic used by stakeholders opposed to enhanced transportation spending and investment, driving 
wedges between residents using notions of stratification, ethnocentrism, and distrust to increase 
urban conflict. A 2018 ballot initiative to expand regional transportation options in the Nashville, 
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TN region is illustrative, as opponents used racial and fear-based arguments, including 
leveraging a fatal shooting at a local Waffle House, to discourage support of the plan (Haruch 
2018).      
Equity 
Equity refers to fairness in the distribution of benefits and costs of urban policy decisions 
(Taylor and Norton 2009). Equity, and its cousin social justice, are powerful ideas for urban 
transport planners (Albrecht et al. 2017) that are often used to defend the need for compensatory 
public action (Deakin 1999), like paratransit and urban bus services. Indeed, “given 
transportation’s intimate connection with providing people with access to resources and 
opportunities, one might expect the practice of transportation planning and policy to be a 
significant force for promotion of transportation equity…but exemplars of equitable 
transportation planning seem to be the exception” (Grengs 2013, 142).   
A concern with justice and equity requires an understanding of how public policies 
impact specific social groups, not just the aggregate whole (Fainstein 2008). Transportation 
systems based in the private automobile contribute to the social isolation of youth, aged, 
handicapped, racial and ethnic minorities and women, who tend to have less reliable access to 
private vehicles. Transit, in contrast, provides a vital link for people with disabilities and senior 
citizens, allowing them to stay connected and maintain productive roles in society (Grengs 
2005). Transportation policies that move cities closer to being a “just city” include mandating 
that urban infrastructural investments provide benefits directly to low-income people, and 
keeping intracity transit fares very low (Fainstein 2010), or not charging a fare at all (Prince and 
Dellheim 2018).  
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In practice, local officials and policymakers seem to have difficulty integrating equity 
concerns into planning and policy processes (Linovski et al 2018). Part of the challenge is that 
equity can defined in numerous ways (Taylor and Norton 2009) that do not always include a 
concern for different social and economic groups. Equity often loses out to more pressing 
concerns, like attracting ‘choice riders’ or drivers to transit (Grengs 2005), or spurring economic 
development (King and Fischer 2016, Culver 2017). To be successful, sustainable transport 
policy must avoid the common pitfall of ignoring the larger systems in which transportation 
activity is embedded (Goldman and Gorham 2006), which includes engaging with existing 
patterns of segregation and exclusion in ways that do not simply reinforce disparities.   
In conclusion, social sustainability captures the impacts of transportation planning along 
several social dimensions. In the remainder of this paper, I apply the social sustainability 
framework to the case of Kansas City, MO, examining how well the city’s recent streetcar 
investment and the planning processes surrounding it, moves the city toward social 
sustainability. I being with a brief background on the Kansas City case and a description of this 
project’s research methods.    
Background and Methodology 
Kansas City, Missouri is a city of almost a half million people located in a metropolitan 
region of two million that crosses into neighboring Kansas. The city, and its metropolitan region, 
is marked by relatively low density and auto-dependent development patterns and considerable 
racial and economic segregation. According to the 2011 American Housing Survey, 72.6% of 
occupied housing units are single-family detached homes and 90% of all owner-occupied 
housing units in the region have a garage or car port (2013). The majority of recent growth has 
occurred in the region’s suburban counties; The suburban Kansas counties of Johnson, 
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Leavenworth and Miami saw population increases of 21, 11 and 16 percent respectively, 
between 2000 and 2010 while the two counties containing the historical urban areas of Kansas 
City, KS and Kansas City, MO experienced population decreases of .02 and 6.3 percent 
respectively. Although Kansas City, MO increased its population by 4.1%, this growth was 
concentrated in the suburban counties of Platte, Clay and Cass that experienced populations gain 
of 26, 25 and 90 percent respectively.      
Kansas City is the fifth most economically segregated metropolitan area of the country, 
outpaced only by New York City, Bridgeport, CT, Charlotte, NC and San Jose, CA, according to 
a 2017 study by the Urban Institute (Acs et al. 2017). Poverty concentration – an extreme form 
of economic segregation – is a growing problem in the region. The share of neighborhoods with 
more than 40% of households in poverty more than doubled between 1980 and 2010 (American 
Public Square 2018). Economic segregation correlates closely with racial segregation. Residents 
of color are nine times more likely to live in high poverty neighborhoods than non-Hispanic 
white residents in the region (MARC 2014). The impact is particularly strong for the African 
American population: blacks are twelve times more likely than whites to live in areas with a very 
high concentrations of poverty and minority residents while Hispanics are 11 times more likely 
and Asians four times more likely. Black residents represent only 5% of the population in areas 
with low concentrations of poverty, but 45% of the population in areas with very high 
concentrations. Spatially, the city remains racially and economically divided by Troost Avenue, 
a north-south corridor that historically has divided the city’s white and minority populations 





Exhibit 11: Population Change 2000 – 2010 and Land Use, Kansas City Region 
  
 
A key exception to recent suburban growth trends is found in a strip of downtown 
neighborhoods in Kansas City, MO that, since 2016, have been linked by a modern streetcar 
(Exhibit 11). The city’s 2.2-mile streetcar investment is best categorized as a transit-led 
redevelopment project aimed at revitalizing the central city area by attracting new higher density, 
transit-oriented residential and commercial developments. Kansas City is using transport 
investment to reverse trends in disinvestment by providing an urban alternative for residents and 
commercial interests in a largely suburban region. Indeed, local actors discuss the streetcar as a 
transformative investment that lays the groundwork for substantial changes to the regional 
politics of transport in favor of sustainable development.       
In the reminder of this paper, I evaluate the city’s streetcar project using the concept of 
social sustainability. I rely on semi-structured interviews conducted with stakeholders from city 
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government, regional planning agencies, economic development agencies, and advocacy groups 
during the 18 months prior to the opening of the value capture-funded streetcar investment in 
May 2016 and selected follow up interviews conducted in March 2018. Interview subjects were 
identified from a review of planning documents, city websites, and organizational flow charts as 
well as through snowball sampling. I complement the interview data with content analysis of 
planning documents, participant observation and analysis of demographic data obtained from the 
U.S. Census Bureau, and the Mid-American Regional Council, the metropolitan planning 
organizations for the Kansas City region.   
Findings  
To what extent will Kansas City’s streetcar investment be derided as a cost or promoted 
as a benefit by future generations? To answer this question, I use the concept of social 
sustainability to examine the streetcar planning process and complementary policy efforts in its 
vicinity. I illustrate the institutional mechanisms that help the city make considerable headway 
toward ‘bringing back the city’ and building trust and community and also highlight the 
institutional barriers that enhance the isolation of certain social groups, ultimately jeopardizing 
the long-term social sustainability of the city and the region that it anchors.  
Urbanity 
For a majority of residents in the Kansas City region, urbanity is a four-letter word. 
“There is a love/hate relationship with the downtown and urban core. A lot of people live here 
not because they want to live in a big city but just because this is where the jobs are located.” 
(City Council Member, May 2015) Increasingly, however, residents are demanding more 
walkable and dense urban spaces that provide an anecdote to the isolating qualities of technology 
and suburban development. This includes a desire to get away from automobile dependence; 
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“people of all ages are interested in proximity and proximity doesn’t work with independent 
vehicles” (MARC Director, May 2015).   
The city’s streetcar investment is aimed at changing development patterns in the urban 
core, in terms of types of projects and momentum of investment. It also aims to offer regional 
residents a greater range of lifestyle options that go beyond the low density, suburban-like 
developments found throughout the city and region. As the Mayor explains, the neighborhoods 
served by the streetcar are  
Very much suited to people who want to have some asphalt, some neon some places to 
go, some funk to their life. [A place that has a] different edge to it, different options to it, 
density where you actually like being in groups of people that look differently, act 
differently, taste differently. Where you have authenticity and a little grit. Where you can 
live, work, play in the same area and never have to get into a car. (Mayor, May 2015)   
Other respondents concurred, discussing streetcar-adjacent development as appealing to a 
segment of the market that doesn't want to live surrounded by surface parking lots and that is 
seeking a lot of activity and ‘stuff’ in their desired environment. Several respondents attributed 
this change to young professional and millennials seeking urban lifestyles and identified the 
streetcar as a cool amenity that helps attract and retain recent college graduates.  
Urbanity is a clear goal of Kansas City’s streetcar investment, and evidence of its 
achievement is found in emerging development patterns of the neighborhoods served by streetcar 
investment. These trends are nurtured by the adoption of mixed-use land regulations that 
discourage low density and unproductive uses, like surface parking and the introduction of new 
non-local actors into local development networks.  
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Development Regulations. City council adopted new land use regulations for Kansas 
City’s downtown and near downtown neighborhoods in 2010 (Lamer 2010), two years before the 
streetcar was approved by voters and six years before it started operations. Prior to the streetcar, 
changes to land development policies did not produce the downtown revitalization that city 
leaders desired. As of 2014, almost 40% (2,157 of 5,507) of tax parcels in the streetcar district 
were vacant or used for surface parking lots (Exhibit 12), almost three times higher than the 
citywide rate of 13.5%. City officials took special aim at these tax parcels, using the streetcar 
financing mechanism to levy an annual special assessment of $54.73/surface parking space in 
order to provide a financial incentive for redevelopment.  
Since construction began, development in the streetcar district has been substantial. 
Between 2014 and January 2018, a total of 132 construction projects worth over 2.2 billion 
dollars have been completed or permitted within the streetcar district21. The majority of these 
(102) are renovations of existing buildings, reinforcing the authentic urban feel of the built 
environment. Residential developments account for 28.6% of categorized development projects 
and, as of January 2018, had created more than 3,251 additional residential units, with several 
thousand more in construction. Office and retail developments are also popular, comprising 
20.9% and 18.3% of development projects respectively. Although the city’s downtown is clearly 
a mixed-use district, less than 10% of new development projects in the district are categorized as 




                                                          
21 Based on the city-maintained database of development projects in the streetcar district 
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Exhibit 12: Land Use and Vacant Parcels in the Streetcar District  
  
Land Use Vacant Parcels 
 
Real estate activity in the streetcar district is heavily supported by public incentives. 
Since 2014, almost half (45%) of the development projects in the streetcar district have received 
tax increment financing, tax abatement, or historic tax credits. Tax abatement is the most 
common form of subsidy, with 39.3% (52) of projects receiving a total abatement of $1.7 billion 
dollars, an amount equal to 77% of the total investment in the district during the four-year 
period. More than 90% of these incentives were in place prior to the streetcar investment, thus, 
like land use changes, the streetcar appears key to facilitating the uptake of existing incentive 
programs, namely by attracting new development interests.   
Development Networks. Prior to the streetcar, real estate development in Kansas City 
was severely constrained by the conservative practices of local lending institutions. As the 




The banks are still fairly, fairly conservative and traditional in how they finance 
buildings. When we’re talking to people about deals now and they’re talking about 
parking and we’re saying less and they’re saying, ‘yes we agree but we can’t get our 
lender to agree’ or if it is less, it’s only a little bit less. Because you know anything more 
than a little is too big of a risk. (May 2015)   
The city’s streetcar investment helped to attract new development interests that could 
deliver the higher density, mixed use urbanity sought by the city. As the Director of the MPO 
explained, “there are projects happening downtown that wouldn’t have happened without [the 
streetcar] because there are developers that are looking at Kansas City that probably wouldn’t 
have without the streetcar project.” (MARC Director, May 2015) One of the community activists 
elaborated on the benefits, explaining how an out-of-state developer is doing “three 
redevelopment projects all in a short span of time and really kind of showing people how [urban 
development] is done.” (Community Activist, May 2015) 
The streetcar does appear to be a major factor in development. A 2015 survey conducted 
by the Economic Development Corporation of Kansas City of 35 developers working on projects 
in the streetcar district found that the majority (25) viewed the streetcar investment as a major or 
very important (4 and 5 on a likert scale) factor in their decision to invest in Kansas City, MO, 
with only one respondent saying the streetcar was a detraction. Fostering more urban 
development was a key goal of the city’s streetcar investment. To date, it appears that the 
streetcar has been a substantial factor in the achievement of urbanity, primarily by attracting new 
types of development interests to leverage existing regulatory and financial incentives in the 




Community refers to feelings of trust and companionship among urban residents and 
between residents and public sector officials. Urban development, and transportation investment 
in particular, has a troubled history regarding fostering a sense of community and trust in urban 
areas in general, and in Kansas City more specifically. In the streetcar district, feelings of trust 
and community were nurtured by three elements: (1) creation of a Planned Industrial Expansion 
Authority (PIEA) that allowed arts-based community to grow in place, (2) organizing for the 
streetcar project via Streetcar Neighbors and (3) high levels of public sector responsiveness 
during project implementation.    
Arts Abatement. In the mid-1990s an increasing number of artists began turning underused 
factory and industrial buildings into live-work spaces, bringing new activity and investment to a 
declining near downtown neighborhood known as the Crossroads. Neighborhood members 
fought against aestheticizing the Crossroads with themed street furniture; indeed, “for many it 
was the area’s very grittiness – its tolerance for noisy, messy creative undertakings that were 
appealing” (L’Heureux 2015). As the neighborhood’s trajectory changed, and arts-related events 
and gallery openings started attracting visitors from throughout the region, city officials became 
concerned that this emerging community would be displaced by the city’s 2007 tax assessments, 
which were expected to double or triple property tax bills in some neighborhoods.   
City officials initially planned to seek new state legislation aimed at protecting arts 
communities from burdensome tax increases but it quickly became clear that would be a multi-
year process with no guarantee of success. Instead, the city decided “to use something we 
already have, we just have to tweak how we use it.” (EDCKC Planner, May 2015) Staff 
members at the Economic Development Corporation of Kansas City, a quasi-public authority 
that manages the city’s tax abatement and development incentive programs, created a special 
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Planned Industrial Expansion Area (PIEA) overlay specifically designated for arts uses, which 
city council approved in 2007. PIEAs are a common tax abatement tool that helps to facilitate 
development in blighted areas, or areas with blighting conditions by providing up to 25 years tax 
abatement, sales tax exemption on construction materials and making projects eligible for 
eminent domain. Multiple PIEA designations existed within the Crossroads district but only the 
new overlay district targeted art-related uses.    
Exhibit 13: Crossroads PIEA and Streetcar District 
 
The Crossroads Arts PIEA provides 10 years of property tax abatement for properties that 
have 50% or more of their space occupied by eligible arts and cultural uses (identified through 
specific North American Industry Classification System codes). As the Director of the Economic 
Development Agency explained,  
A thing that motivated the creation of the Arts PIEA was seeing the role that artists 
played in NY SOHO district - the artists come in and take risks, are willing to take on 
87 
 
funky old buildings. They stabilize it and then the residential developers go in with 
renovated apartments or condos but then the "tax guys" see that it is no longer a funky 
old building but now it’s got higher value that we can tax and rates go up, beyond the 
ability of artists in the area to pay. (May 2015)  
Or, as an EDCKC staff member who worked on the project stated more bluntly, “It was 
designed to mitigate the gentrification effect.” (May 2015) The Crossroads neighborhood is one 
of Kansas City’s success stories. The district’s monthly First Friday celebration attracts 20 to 30 
thousand people (Spencer 2016) but the district’s impact is not confined to arts-related 
businesses or events. As one of the city’s economic development planners explained, “keeping 
those arts businesses helped [get] more of the creative industries, the architects and the 
marketing and advertising people and stuff like that. Pretty soon that kind of rolled over into 
Tech. The Tech boom here is a result of the Crossroads Arts PIEA.” (May 2015) In December 
2016 the city council approved an extension to the PIEA extending the property tax abatement 
for an additional 15 years, freezing assessments at their 2016 value and providing a 50% 
property tax abatement for eligible properties (Spencer 2016).   
The Arts PIEA allows members of an existing arts-based community to grow in place, 
protecting them from large changes in land values that tend to accompany gentrification and 
helping to brand the neighborhood as a regional center for arts activity. The city’s efforts to 
protect this growing near downtown neighborhood laid the groundwork for the streetcar project, 
as these same residents became important advocates for enhanced transit in the downtown core.      
Community Advocates and Networks. Residents living in the Crossroads district, and benefitting 
directly from the city’s innovative use of the PIEA tool, played a key role in the streetcar 
planning process. Feelings of trust among community members laid the groundwork for a robust 
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citizen-led outreach effort – led by the community-based Streetcar Neighbors - in the months 
prior to the streetcar election. One of the organizations’ founders explains:  
During the feasibility study [and] planning process we started building grassroots 
support because it wasn’t on [the city’s] radar yet…we tried to get all those voters so 
that when the city had questions about the project and they needed a community answer 
we spoke with, not one voice, but people knew how to answer the questions. Because this 
stuff, it’s kind of wonky. (Streetcar Neighbors Founder, May 2015) 
Streetcar Neighbors also distributed pro-streetcar window signs to business owners who 
supported the project as a “very cheap and easy way to show the business [tenant] support for the 
streetcar” and made T-shirts to create another avenue for people to express their support for the 
project. “We were really out in front on the messaging, it really was a grassroots project because 
the city is not good about messaging on anything…the staff is out there engineering and not 
figuring out how to message.” (Streetcar Neighbors Founder, May 2015)  
The biggest impact the advocacy group had, however, was facilitating voter turnout for 
the streetcar election in 2012. As the mayor explains, “the activists were out notarizing 
everything, making signs and putting them in windows” (May 2015). According to one local 
activist,     
[W]hen the election process started we had a cadre of people that could get into the 
buildings because unlike a regular election in single family home neighborhoods you 
can’t just canvas like that. We essentially ran the ground game of that election because 
[city officials] didn’t know how to organize downtown. We inserted ourselves into the 
process instead of just relying on people to figure it out and give them information we 
made a place for them to come and get [ballots notarized]. And so all that kind of made it 
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kind of really easy because the process is not. But it gave us the opportunity to talk to 
people and answer questions and at a very one on one level. (Streetcar Neighbors, May 
2015)  
The city’s efforts to protect an arts-based community had the unintended consequence of 
creating a transit-friendly groups of residents who organized and advocated for the streetcar 
investment. But how the city handled the implementation of that investment, also went far 
toward building trust between residents and elected officials.  
Public Outreach and Engagement. Public sector implementation strategies of the streetcar project 
were purposefully concerned with nurturing feelings of trust between residents, business owners 
and city officials. Indeed, the city felt it was very important that the streetcar implementation 
process be marked by quality customer service. As the project manager explained,  
This is the most construction that a lot of downtown folks have ever seen. Unlike other 
cities where it’s pretty much par for the course, and there’s a lot of development already 
going on, Kansas City is at a new place, at a new crossroads, so for all those reasons it 
was really important to the city to make sure that we had really good communication, 
and a high degree of responsiveness (May 2015)  
To manage the community outreach efforts, public relations and messaging during 
construction, the city hired a senior communications associate from the local firm of Parsons and 
Associates. As this associate explained, “we decided to make this model all about reassuring 
people.” (May 2015). Prior to streetcar construction, the city sent out an introductory letter to all 
property and business owners along the construction route detailing the project timeline and 
providing a direct cell phone number that would be answered 24 hours a day and seven days a 
week. This phone number was also listed on business cards, signs and magnets distributed by the 
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Kansas City Streetcar Authority. “People get comfort when they have quick responsiveness, 
when they feel they can get to a real person, they are not just calling an office or getting a 
voicemail.” (Project Outreach Coordinator, May 2015)      
Outreach accelerated during construction, as the city sent out postcards with construction 
updates, attended community and business meetings, conducted a door to door business canvass 
and connected with property owners and business and residents over social media. The canvass 
provided the city with an inventory of business needs along the corridor but it also helped them 
devise innovative solutions to construction-related problems. As the outreach coordinator 
explains, “[business owners] had a lot of good ideas from other projects and we took those and 
built on that, whether it was special signage that said so and so’s parking is around the corner or 
changing construction schedule to accommodate deliveries.” (May 2015)  
Personal, face to face outreach efforts also helped to create greater trust and working 
partnerships between the city and private businesses and property owners along the streetcar 
route.  
The technology is so important and we tweet many times a day but when it comes to how 
you are affecting someone’s business, especially, small businesses, that’s their livelihood. 
And that’s scary stuff when there are a lot of cones coming down the street or they don’t 
know if they are going to be out of water for a week, and they don’t know. And when they 
don’t know, they start imagining the worst-case scenarios. So it’s so much better if you 
can get out ahead of that and get that information to them and build that confidence 
before its right at their door step literally. (Outreach Coordinator, May 2015) 
In Kansas City, city officials’ innovative use of a Planning Industrial Expansion 
Authority (PIEA) tax incentive provided a tool that allowed an emerging, near downtown arts 
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neighborhood, known as the Crossroads, to prosper. Strong feelings of trust in the neighborhood 
combined with the formation of a local advocacy group, Streetcar Neighbors, to facilitate the 
approval of a modern streetcar investment in the neighborhood. Streetcar implementation was 
specifically concerned with maintaining high levels of trust, employing an outreach coordinator 
to provide high quality customer service. These institutional innovations go far toward building 
trust and a sense of community in the streetcar district. They also contrast, drastically, with the 
city’s 2014 efforts to expand the streetcar system into a wider range of neighborhoods, 
connecting racial and economically disparate areas on the city’s east and south sides, discussed 
below.   
Two years after voters approved the streetcar starter line, the city put forth a more 
extensive investment plan that extended the streetcar several miles south to the wealthy, single 
family Brookside neighborhood and created two new express bus lines connecting the downtown 
streetcar with neighborhoods located East of Troost Avenue, the city’s historical black/white 
boundary (Appendix C). The Mayor explained the importance of the proposed siting in terms of 
the city’s demographic patterns:  
The extensions going east and west were extremely important because of the way the city 
is set up. If you go north to south you are going to get a slice of similar demographics, if 
you to the west side you are going to hit a Latino group and if you head east, now you’re 
starting to get a little close to the minority group on Troost. If you go east and west you 
cut through all that because you are moving against the demographics and that’s why we 
wanted to go east and west. (May 2015) 
Planning for this expansion was marked by considerable strife, mistrust and racial antagonism on 
behalf of the project’s opponents, with mail circulators even equating the streetcar investment 
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with Jim Crow and slavery (Appendix D). Fundamentally, this streetcar expansion debate was 
marked by competing claims of equity and fairness. The Mayor and city officials defended the 
project for providing enhanced transit to new income and racial groups and expanding public 
investment into less wealthy – and historically ignored - areas of the city. Project opponents, 
including a majority of residents in the poorer east side neighborhoods were concerned with a 
different kind of justice. As the executive director the streetcar explains, “We have a huge 
district that we are collecting resources from and many of them are miles away from where the 
service would ultimately go and so is that an equitable [investment]?” (May 2015). The next 
section examines the tensions surrounding equity and fairness in the streetcar starter line.   
Equity 
Public policies in the city’s streetcar district support urbanity and community, the first 
two pillars of social sustainability. This section considers how well streetcar implementation 
supports the third dimension, equity, by examining who benefits from the city’s enhanced 
urbanity and community and evaluating the streetcars’ impact on racial and economic 
segregation.  
Population in the seven census tracts covered by the streetcar district increased by 16% 
between 2008 and 2016, a considerably difference from city and regional growth rates for the 
same period. Based on ACS estimates from 2008 – 2012 and 2012 – 2016, the streetcar project 
and developments in its proximity appear to primarily benefit a wealthier and whiter population 
than the city and region as a whole22. Relatively small populations make some of these estimates 
unreliable, particularly changes in the non-Hispanic white and owner-occupied numbers, which 
                                                          
22 ACS estimates for the seven census tracts covered by the streetcar district have fairly large margins of error. 
Statistically, the percentage of white residents and owner-occupied units may actually be decreasing. The 
estimates for the Hispanic population are also suspect: In both 2000 and 2012 – 2016, the Hispanic population was 
around 8% but for 2008-2012 the estimate was 6%, accounting for the large percentage change in Figure 2.        
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could statistically be decreases. In general, however, demographic changes in the streetcar 
district show a different trend than those in the city and the region more generally (Exhibit 14), 
and tend to align with the demographics of gentrification – i.e. increasing population but a 
decreasing number of African Americans and residents living below the poverty line.   
 
Exhibit 14: Demographic Change in the Streetcar District, City and 
Region, 2008 - 2016 
 
In part, these demographic trends reflect the value of the streetcar to particular income 
groups. As the Director of the region’s Housing Authority explained, “the streetcar doesn’t serve 
low income families who need [transit], doesn’t connect them to jobs. Residents like being 
downtown, near downtown but for most of them living near jobs and better schools…is the 
goal.” (May 2015)  
Economic Integration Policies Even if low income residents wanted to move into the 
streetcar district, the relatively high cost of living and the lack of any affordable housing program 
severely precludes them from doing so. Racial and income integration was not a goal of the 
streetcar investment. Indeed, several interview respondents pushed back about the value of 
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policies aimed at social integration. As one of the city council members – and a professionally 
trained economist - explained,  
All the data shows that people tend to live next to other people that have the same socio-
economic status and background they do. White people tend to live together, African 
Americans tend to live together, Hispanics tend to live together. You know Chinatown, 
Little Italy, it’s just the way it has always been (May 2015) 
Income integration was also viewed skeptically by stakeholders. The head of the city’s 
Housing and Neighborhood Development department stated, “Housing affordability is not an 
issue in Kansas City, [its] cheap for renters.” (May 2015) Indeed, the Kansas City region prides 
itself on its affordability (GKCCC 2018), a theme that came up in almost every interview; Of the 
23 respondents, only one – the Director of the local Housing Authority - argued that there was a 
need for affordable housing, stating “we've got 17,000 people on the waiting list and the city 
couldn't care less.” (May 2015)     
Reflecting this dominant view, Kansas City does not have a standing affordable housing 
policy. The city relies on the development approval process and tax incentives to encourage 
developers to provide affordable units in the streetcar’s vicinity. To date, this approach has been 
a failure, as illustrated by the case of Cordish Development’s One and Two Light high-rise 
residential developments (Osterhedlt 2018). Master planning documents for these luxury 
apartment developments promised to set aside 15% of units below market rate, but the developer 
ultimately provided no units below market rate, citing unexpected costs that made such a 
commitment unprofitable. In 2018, when the developer approached the city for a $17.5 million 
subsidy for a parking garage in the Third Light development (similar to the subsidies provided 
for parking garages in the first two projects), the city made the subsidy contingent upon 
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simultaneous development of the historic Midland Office Building into 100 workforce (60 to 
80% of AMI) apartments (Rodriguez 2018).  
Several months later, in June 2018, as it became clear that developers had been receiving 
tax incentives for units that rented at or above market value, city council finally defined 
affordability as 30% or less of AMI (~$1,100/mo) and directed the city manager to prioritize 
developments that kept rents below $1,000/mo, an amount about $150 greater than the city’s 
median rent in 2016. Although Kansas City is beginning to address affordability, regional and 
local discourses that devalue affordability policies support the city’s project-based approach and 
discourage the development of a larger policy framework for affordable housing in streetcar 
planning. These institutional structures serve as primary barriers to fostering greater equity in the 
streetcar project, but how local actors define equity is also a barrier to greater social 
sustainability.  
Equity Discourses. Equity is generally concerned with fairness in the distribution of 
public resources, but it can be defined in numerous ways, and with respect to multiple ‘units of 
analysis’ (Taylor and Norton 2009). Equity discourses among streetcar stakeholders tended to 
emphasize geographical equity and focus on individual costs and benefits rather than viewing 
equity from the perspective of different social, racial and income groups. One of the streetcar 
board members was critical of transport planning processes that prioritize the needs of 
disadvantaged communities, claiming that transit advocates do a disservice by "reinforcing the 
assumption that transit services in the US are only for poor people by making everything about 




Regional and city stakeholders categorize the streetcar starter line as an equitable and fair 
investment, largely based on the idea that the people primarily benefitting from the streetcar 
service (i.e. property owners along the line) were also the ones paying for the investment. This 
appeal to the fairness of beneficiaries financing focuses on geographical equity, a primary 
concern of elected officials (Taylor 2004). But this viewpoint was not limited to elected officials. 
Similar views were articulated by members of the regional transit advocacy group as well as a 
local planning academic who, despite focusing their own research on the exclusion of particular 
groups in urban policy, dismissed my questions about the equity of the streetcar project as 
misplaced, since those paying for the investment were the same as those benefitting from it.   
Indeed, the only (potentially) socially marginalized group that is supported by policy 
efforts in the streetcar’s vicinity are “dedicated urbanists”, artists and those seeking an alternative 
lifestyle. This focus on the ‘creative class’ as a driver of economic development and 
revitalization, and the exclusion of African Americans and poorer residents, reflects the 2012 
revisions to Richard Florida’s “tolerance” index. In the 2002 analysis Kansas City ranked 73rd 
out of 268 urban areas, but in the 2012 revision that incorporates racial integration, the city 
dropped to 106th out of 268 urban areas (L’Heareux 2015). It is important for urban areas to 
expand the lifestyle choices available for residents but it is equally important that public policies 
ensure these new options are accessible by a range of income and racial groups, if they intend for 
contemporary investments and policies to be viewed by future generations as a benefit, not cost.            
Conclusion 
Kansas city’s streetcar project does a good job fostering urban vitality and building trust 
between residents and city officials in the areas it serves. These outcomes are the result of 
specific institutional strategies – including using the streetcar investment to change local 
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development networks, leveraging tax abatement to protect an emerging community of dedicated 
urbanists, and developing a robust citizen outreach and engagement program. But the 
institutional innovations of local actors do little to address the city’s conspicuous spatial 
segregation, and - given the lack of affordable housing policies and existing equity frameworks - 
will probably make segregation issues worse. In Kansas City, local strategies to foster more 
sustainable development are embedded in a discourse of ‘choice’ in terms of providing more 
lifestyle options for existing and new residents, but what social groups are able to benefit from 
this expansion of choice is considerably limited.   
The planning processes of the streetcar project, and the policies that exist in its proximity, 
reflect a sub-municipal approach to sustainable development that mimics the ‘splintering 
urbanism” of urban areas across the world (Graham and Marvin 2001). In the ‘splintering’ of 
Kansas City, infrastructure “networks supporting more socially and economically marginal parts 
of the city are likely to experience increasing underinvestment, neglect and marginalization…and 
fewer and fewer material connections will work to integrate the diverse social and economic 
circuits of cities” (Graham and Marvin 2001, pp. 97). Inequities in urban transport investment 
“emerge from the imbalances of political power that inevitably find their way into the 
transportation planning process” (Levine 2013, 142) but they are institutionalized or challenged 
in local implementation strategies.   
Indeed, sustainable development’s concern with altering the socio-spatial structure of 
urban areas requires a change to the “distribution of power and influence within society” (WCED 
1987, 37). Kansas City’s streetcar project challenges certain power structures - i.e. bringing in 
new developers to change the physical status quo, facilitating a change in real estate investment 
in the downtown core - but it leaves others untouched. Thus, while the streetcar project provides 
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some socially sustainable outcomes, in terms of urbanity and community, it fails to challenge or 
even marginally chip away at existing power structures that seek to – consciously or not - 
reinforce and replicate patterns of racial and income segregation in the city.  
The Kansas City case presented here is illustrative of the politics of transport and land 
use in no to low growth midwestern urban areas. Embedded in largely conservative policy 
environment, the existing social, economic and political structures of Midwestern cities impact 
streetcar implementation in ways that produce different outcomes than their high growth, 
progressive coastal counterparts. In assessing social sustainability – or sustainability in general – 
context is paramount. In order for us to foster more equity and justice in development, and better 
social outcomes from transport policy we need to play off existing values and tendencies in 
American cities. The implementation of social justice is a circular process in which the 
preexistence of equity begets sentiments in its favor, democratic habits produce popular 
participation and diversity increases tolerance (Fainstein 2008).  
Beyond simply facilitating dense, mixed use development, or contributing to a sense of 
community and trust, institutional strategies must reflect a concern with who benefits from 
transport investment. Considering institutional context, and how actors create new institutional 
strategies in response to context, is a key way to dissect existing development conditions and 
derive policies best suited to deliver equitable development outcomes. Research on the social 
impacts of transportation provide an important factual basis for reform efforts but “because the 
appropriate remedy depends on the causes, there is much work for planners to do in investigating 











In the previous essays, I use an institutional framework to examine the politics of urban 
transport investment in American cities. The first essay illustrates the utility of institutional 
analysis by using it to explain the divergent outcomes of transit and road investment during the 
20th century. It also provides historical context for the in-depth examination of a modern streetcar 
investment in Kansas City provided in essays two and three. In this conclusion, I summarize the 
main findings of this research effort, answer key questions posed in the introduction and draw 
general conclusions about the state of urban transport investment in the age of devolution.     
Kansas City is emblematic of urban transport in America during the past century. Like 
most urban areas, the city was connected by dense networks of streetcar lines at the beginning of 
the 20th century. Even the County Club Plaza, the nation’s first shopping district specifically 
built to accommodate shoppers arriving by automobile (Mines 1999), was served by multiple 
streetcar lines when it opened in 1923. But in the decades that followed the Great Depression, 
Kansas City embraced 20th century policies that supported single family housing and 
automobile-oriented development. The city expanded its boundaries several times in the 1960s to 
accumulate more land for low-density suburban development, downtown buildings were raised 
for surface parking lots and mass transit increasingly became a beleaguered service used only by 
residents that had no other option.   
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These conditions have not stopped regional and local plans from focusing on 
concentrated development and enhanced transit, but they have severely curtailed plan 
implementation. As MARC’s director explains, “We’ve been dealt a bad set of cards in this town 
[regarding transit] – everything from low congestion to low density to no growth controls to bi-
state tensions and economic competition, and a Midwestern, conservative tax environment” 
(May 2015). City officials expressed a similar sentiment, adding a lack of state support (and even 
outright hostility) for enhanced transit and the historical orientation of federal grants toward 
mobility and environmental impacts to the list of barriers; a local advocate and architect pointed 
out that the city’s own policies regarding sewer line extensions, road investment and greenfield 
development contributes to its vacant property problem and provides a “textbook case of 
encouraging sprawl” (Transit Advocate, May 2015).   
The problem-solving activities of local officials profiled in these essays above is a 
function of Kansas City’s ‘bad set of cards’. Existing conditions are not an excuse for failure to 
consider the cheaper option of Bus Rapid Transit or to adopt inclusionary housing policies - I 
believe transport in Kansas City would be improved, long term, if these considerations were 
more paramount in the planning for the streetcar starter line - but they do illuminate the structural 
factors shaping institutional design activities of local actors. Institutional strategies reflect local 
structuring conditions and political realities but are enabled by the larger processes of devolution 
that allow localities to shape policy tools and processes to fit local conditions. 
How are local actors in Kansas City using devolution to their advantage? Decentralized 
financing in the form of value capture provided a ‘participatory capture’ tool that allowed local 
actors to shape the voting pool. Financing strategies underwrote the development a non-profit 
governance mechanism that purposefully moved decision-making about the streetcar investment 
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out of city hall, vesting responsibility with a small group of private property owners and 
residents in the investment’s proximity. These organizational and financial innovations helped to 
promote the streetcar as an economic development project, whose impacts primarily accrued in 
land development, not changes in travel behavior. Decentralized approaches to other social 
problems are also evident in Kansas City. While there is no citywide affordable housing policy, 
local actors’ innovative use of a tax abatement program provides a level of protection from 
gentrification pressures based on residents’ arts affiliation, not on income or other economic 
measures of need. The streetcar investment attracted new types of development interests to the 
city but, to date, their impact has been confined largely to the streetcar district and near 
downtown neighborhoods.       
The essays in this manuscript have not profiled the full range of local problem solving 
and institutional innovation that I observed during field work. Other innovations of note include 
an expedited permitting and review process for development in the streetcar vicinity, active 
tracking and promotion of development projects by economic development staff, use of a private 
contractor for operations as a means to avoid the ‘unfavorable’ union contracts of the regional 
transit agency, decision to call the project a streetcar to avoid the negative associations with 
previous light rail plans, using the authority model to vest operational decisions with the same 
group responsible for paying for operations, and rebranding of disparate transit services 
(including the streetcar) under the single “Ride KC” brand, to name a few.   
My review of Kansas City’s institutional design processes and outcomes suggests several 
lessons. Providing free transit can help focus attention on dynamics of the transport – land use 
relationship and remove the (often problematic) metric of fare box recovery. In areas where auto-
dependence reigns supreme, fare free transit can be a way to attract new people to transit in ways 
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that may lay the groundwork for future transformations. Focusing on the non-mobility benefits of 
transport can also attract new interests to transport planning, particularly in regions where the 
business community does not involve itself in civic and public affairs. New public investments, 
like the streetcar, can change momentum in development trends by attracting developers that 
provide denser, mixed use projects that local banks are hesitant to finance. Not only do these new 
developers provide new investment, they also model how to do complicated redevelopment 
projects and renovations that are unfamiliar to local developers. When viewed as economic 
development investments, urban transport investments shape urban form by signaling public 
sector priorities, not by changing travel behavior.  
The innovative use of an existing tax abatement program to stabilize an emerging arts 
community is a tactic that deserves more consideration, especially in environments where state 
legislatures or city officials are reticent to create more widespread affordability programs. Public 
investments, like the streetcar, can benefit from the feelings of trust and community that are 
engendered by housing stabilization programs, improving project implementation and 
reinforcing a positive view of the public sector that begets more collaboration. City officials can 
add to this with robust outreach and a focus on high-quality customer service and 
responsiveness. Although Kansas City did not implement it, several planners mentioned the need 
for a grant program to help small businesses stay afloat during streetcar construction, a tactic that 
could be combined with the high-quality customer service to counter the short-term negative 
impacts of urban infrastructure construction.    
Who Wins and Loses?  
What these essays have also illustrated, however, is that the same innovations that helped 
local actors overcome existing barriers to investment also shape who benefits from investment. A 
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lack of concern with affordable housing in the streetcar’s vicinity guarantees that certain income 
(and racial) groups will be excluded from the land development benefits provided by the 
streetcar. As a signal of public sector priorities, the streetcar designates certain near downtown 
neighborhoods as worthy of investment at the same time it signals that other areas of the city are 
less important. Although this strategy reflects the idea that a strong central core is fundamental 
for a strong regional economy, questions of how benefits are distributed among residents remain 
paramount.   
Large, regional transit investments also favor particular neighborhoods over others but as 
regional assets that provide enhanced accessibility, the benefits of these investments are not 
solely concentrated in the neighborhoods they serve to that same extent as streetcar projects. 
Kansas City’s institutional strategies have set transit investments on a particular trajectory or 
institutional path, that is marked by a focus on economic development impacts and relies on 
implementation strategies that site projects where there is political support and the ability to pay 
rather than a need for enhanced transit. Currently, this pathway excludes any concern for race 
and income or more inclusive planning processes that have a regional orientation. While Kansas 
City’s starter line does not attempt to change the politics of inequality and segregation – a missed 
opportunity - there are signs that it may be having positive impacts on the politics of transport.   
Is this Desirable?  
From a transportation perspective, the streetcar starter line provides minimal benefits for 
regular transit riders. From a group equity perspective, Kansas City’s streetcar does little to solve 
the city’s entrenched problems of racial and economic segregation and may even be making 
them worse. Based on local economic development goals, however, Kansas City’s combination 
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of institutional strategies appears to be largely successful in terms of ‘getting rails in the ground’ 
to stimulate private investment in downtown and near downtown neighborhoods.  
Although clearly proud of their success to date, local actors I interviewed were 
universally in agreement that the streetcar would only be considered a long-term success if it 
changed the local and regional politics to favor additional transit investment. As the director of 
MARC stated, “A 2-mile streetcar is a toy train, there’s no long-term utility to it. It either needs 
to be going [north] and [south] within the next 10 years or it wouldn’t have been worth doing” 
(May 2015). In interviews conducted before the starter line began operations, respondents 
expressed great optimism that once residents experienced the streetcar line, “see it running on 
time and on budget” (Streetcar Authority Director, May 2015), “see that people love it and that 
its accomplishing something” (Mayor, May 2015), “feel, touch and experience it” (Regional 
Transit Advocate, May 2015) expansion would be a foregone conclusion. As the city manager 
put it more bluntly, “they don’t call it the Show-Me-State for nothing” (May 2015).       
Indeed, in August 2017 a little more than one year after the streetcar began operating, 
voters approved the creation of a new taxing district that would pay for the streetcar’s 3.75-mile 
extension from Union Station to the University of Missouri - Kansas City campus at 51st and 
Brookside (Appendix I). City officials again drew financing boundaries to shape the electorate 
and used a special mail-in ballot process that resulted in 2,458 votes in support and 1,048 against 
expansion; or 8.1% of eligible voters in favor and 3.4% opposed. The city altered the streetcar’s 
governing strategy for the expansion, substituting a directly-elected board of directors for the 
starter line’s appointed board and making a positive step toward increasing public input into 
operations and management of the streetcar system. In November 2017, residents in the streetcar 
district elected members to sit on the streetcar board at the polling places and several months 
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later approved a third and final ballot establishing a 1-cent sales tax and special property 
assessments within 1/3 mile of the route. Expanded service also appears to be taking on more 
light rail qualities, with fewer stations spaced further apart than they were for the starter line (9 
stops on the expanded 3.75 mile route vs. 12 on the 2.2 mile starter line).  
Even with local approval and financing secured, however, the expansion line remains in 
limbo. Although the city received a $25 million TIGER grant for the starter line, they were fully 
prepared to cover expenses with local sources of financing. The TIGER grant allowed city 
officials to construct a double track on the bridge to Union Station (the southern end of the 
route), reducing the chances for delay and disruption but the project was never contingent on 
federal or state funding. The expansion line, at an estimated cost of $316 million (three times 
more than the starter line), will require a 50% federal match to move forward. In September 
2018, shortly after securing local funding, city officials applied to the DOT’s New Starts 
program for a $151 million-dollar grant.   
The institutional strategies local actors employed for the starter line, and for the 
extension, appear to be played out. This was not unexpected; local actors realized that starter line 
implementation “is a model that has little chance of being replicated because of the tax base” and 
that there was “probably one other corridor – Main Street - that could work with a TDD” 
(MARC Director, May 2015). Not only do new investments require more capital than can be 
raised locally, but voters have also curtailed the city’s ability to use value capture financing to 
shape the electorate. Less than one week after voters in the expansion district approved a new 
streetcar investment, in August 2017, residents throughout the city passed an citizen initiative 
that requires all future transit investments be put to a city-wide vote. Local stakeholder’s claims 
that the starter line would spur support for “a city-wide tax and then a county-wide tax and then a 
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regional tax that goes to fund multiple types of transportation” (Regional Transit Advocate, May 
2015) will now be put to the test.  
Kansas City’s streetcar system will ultimately be evaluated on how well it laid the 
groundwork for concentrated development and enhanced transit to spread outside the downtown 
and near downtown neighborhoods occupied by dedicated urbanists. Do the institutional 
strategies used for the starter line set the city up for success or doom them to failure? More 
broadly, can ‘starter line’ investments be a pathway toward more enhanced transport investment 
or are they doomed to be standalone systems that have little impact on accessibility, and socio-
spatial structure at the regional or citywide level?       
Evaluating Modern Streetcars/Incremental Change 
Modern streetcars are an increasingly popular type of transit investment for a wide range 
of urban areas (Golem and Smith-Heimer 2010). These projects deserve their fair share of 
criticism for failing to provide substantial transit benefits (Ramos-Santiago et al. 2015, Brown 
2013), and for setting transit investment on a trajectory that leads away from mobility and 
accessibility concerns (Lowe and Grengs 2018, Culver 2017, King and Fischer 2016). The 
research presented in this work, however, suggests that a more robust understanding of context is 
key to evaluating whether, and how, starter investments can change the politics of transport in 
ways that favor regional and comprehensive approaches to investment and that consider social 
equity concerns.       
The causal order of the transport and land use dynamic is embodied in transportation 
planning’s best practices: High quality transit services that provide a viable alternative to the 
automobile, combined with appropriate regulations and enabling norms, are key to integrating 
land use and transit in ways that transform urban regions. In Kansas City - and most likely in 
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other Midwestern cities investing in streetcars - the causal order is reversed. Rather than starting 
with a change in mobility to foster a change in development patterns, Kansas City is using the 
streetcar to change development patterns with a second order impact of changing local and 
regional politics in favor of investments that enhance mobility. This political strategy is enabled 
by processes of devolution but shaped by local innovations and context.     
The implementation strategies profiled in the essays above reflect an opportunist and 
pragmatic approach to transport planning. Indeed, Kansas City has played its poor set of cards 
well “by being opportunistic in moving [plans for enhanced transit and concentrated 
development] forward” (MARC Director, May 2015). As stakeholders in Kansas City ‘muddled 
through’ transport planning and implementation, they focused on specific actions to counter the 
problems they face rather than pursuing the abstract ideals of comprehensive regional transport 
investment (Lindblom 1959). Local actors do not eschew the regional approach because they are 
ignorant; they have taken a local approach because they have routinely failed to get support for 
change at the regional level, and changes in federal grant programs (i.e. TIGER) and planning 
metrics (i.e. development impacts) support a localized approach. Practitioners in Kansas City are 
following a systematic method for transport planning, but one that differs considerably from the 
best practices and theoretical assumptions (Lindblom 1959) of contemporary transport planning.          
Kansas City’s pragmatic approach to transport planning has successfully altered physical 
conditions in the downtown area, but it also appears to be influencing stakeholders’ frame of 
references. One of the most vocal advocates for the streetcar starter line and its extension is now 
pushing Bus Rapid Transit as a way to expand the city’s fixed-route transit system into new 
neighborhoods, citing the exorbitant cost of rail and the relative success of BRT at moving 
people long distances. Changes to development momentum in the streetcar’s vicinity - and the 
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associated increases in housing prices – spurred city council members to adopt a more direct 
approach to affordable housing in the streetcar’s vicinity, a strategy that will hopefully play out 
in the coming years better than it has in the past few. Although a pragmatic approach may be 
useful for facilitating investment, its focus on instrumental problem solving and ignorance of the 
uneven distribution of power can threaten the larger democratic process (Hoch 1984).   
In general, Kansas City’s incremental and splintered approach to urban transit invariably 
reflects the interests of the most powerful (Etzioni 1967) and suggests that “networks supporting 
more socially and economically marginal parts of the city are likely to experience increasing 
underinvestment, neglect and marginalization” (Graham and Marvin 2001, pp. 97). An 
incremental approach can be key for getting things done, but it lacks a built-in safeguard for 
relevant values and long-term goals found in the rational-comprehensive approach to collective 
decision-making (Lindblom 1959). It may also hinder the confrontation of key barriers to 
equitable development, as values about inclusion and democratic processes get set aside for a 
focus on getting things done. 
Institutional Analysis + Phronesis Revisited 
Urban change is often a gradual and incremental process as the complexity of existing 
systems creates a path dependence that serves as a source of inertia for the status quo (Curtis and 
Low 2012). In his seminal work on the 20th century planning process, Altshuler (1965) noted that 
acceptable changes must benefit many interests, and concentrate the costs or dis-benefits 
narrowly. In the context of devolution, however, acceptable changes may be benefitting a small 
group of interests that are willing to pay for the services they desire. While such conflicts 
represent “the essence of U.S. politics”, the task of understanding how transportation policy and 
planning reflects and reinforces existing socio-spatial power structures requires that we come to 
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grips with its institutional complexity (Wachs 2004, 145). This not only benefits transport policy 
formation and implementation but also provides a window into the larger workings of society; 
approaching transport planning from an explicitly political perspective can help us better to link 
our theoretical understanding of socio-spatial structural changes with the policies designed to 
plan them (Yago 1983).  
Institutional statures and design activities are the mechanisms through which actors 
facilitate urban change, as the first essay in this manuscript illustrates. The institutional 
assessment of contemporary transport planning provided expands our understanding of the 
impacts of policy devolution on local planning processes and outcomes. It illustrates how local 
actors are designing policy solutions aimed at overcoming institutional barriers rather than 
policies that embody accessibility and income and racial equity. Understanding the perceived 
and actual institutional barriers that influence policy design efforts is key to understanding the 
constraints and opportunities facing local actors in the age of devolution.  
Institutional barriers and opportunities are context dependent and as such, examining 
them helps to illuminate the differences in the politics of transport planning across urban areas. 
Devolution provides an opportunity for academics and advocates to think more strategically 
about how to promote enhanced and equitable transport in different contexts. Appeals to 
environmental protection and reducing congestion fall on deaf ears in particular locations 
because they do not reflect the realities of local conditions. Economic development and 
protection of “alternative lifestyles” may be stronger motivating factors for transport investment 
in slow and no growth cities but, as this work illustrates, they can set transport on a troubling 
institutional trajectory that may be difficult to change, particularly if we fail to understand the 
local politics of investment and how it can be successfully altered.   
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Directionality of institutional causality depends on context. Institutional innovations 
reflect changes in values and priorities but they can also prompt a change in values and priorities 
and potentially serve as an avenue for changing the politics of mobility. This strategic approach 
to social and urban transformation via transportation policy requires an active public sector and  
an environment that supports policy innovation but must also include safeguards for key 
democratic and social values, and to reduce disparities and exclusionary outcomes. Future 
research needs to focus more on the politics of ‘muddling through’ transport planning across 
different contexts (Lindblom 1959) as it is only through evaluating practice that planners can 
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